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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ARBITRATORS IN CHINA:  
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
Duan Xiaosong † 
Abstract: This article is prompted by a Chinese criminal provision governing the 
impartiality of arbitration.  The goals of the article are to critically examine the criminal 
statute created by the provision and to put forward some proposals for reform, which can 
be employed to resolve the tension that exists between arbitrator impartiality and 
deference to arbitration.  Although the provision appears to eliminate the abuse of arbitral 
power, it may raise more questions than it resolves.  This article explores the problems 
and undertakes a comparative analysis of the corresponding United States provision as 
well as an analysis of some cultural and traditional elements influencing the criminal 
statute in China.  Ultimately, this article argues that the concerns can be addressed by 
fine-tuning the rule in order to keep a balance between the previous two conflicting 
values.  Borrowing from U.S. experience, this article proposes a mechanism of judicial 
interpretation.  When contemplating the judicial interpretation, four aspects need to be 
taken into consideration:  private prosecution, criminal liability for the neutral arbitrator, 
civil liability, and a detailed definition of the criminal provision.  Considering these 
aspects of judicial interpretation will ensure that China can retain the benefits of 
arbitration without sacrificing impartiality. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Although international commercial arbitration in China started in the 
1950s,1 it stood still until the adoption of the "reform and opening-up" policy 
of the late 1970s.2  China’s accession into the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) in December 2001 and the growing globalization of the world 
economy have greatly increased international trade and investment in 
China.3  In the wake of the modern explosion of international trade and 
transnational investment, arbitration has become “the accepted method for 
resolving international business disputes.”4  Arbitration has also become a 
                                                      
† Law lecturer, Southwest University (China); Ph.D. candidate, Southwest University of Political 
Science and Law (China).  The author would like to thank Judith A. McMorrow, Professor of Law, Boston 
College Law School, for her guidance and valuable comments throughout the research and writing process. 
1   The first arbitration commission in the People's Republic of China, the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), formerly known as the Foreign Trade 
Arbitration Commission, was set up in April 1956.  Introduction, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index/aboutUs.cms (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).  
2   LIU XIANGSHU, ZHONGGUO SHEWAI ZHONGCAI CAIJUE ZHIDU YU XUELI YANJIU (中国涉外仲裁裁决
制度与学理研究) [A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARD 
SYSTEM OF CHINA] 24 (2001). 
3   See INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE (2011), 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/library/government-resources/chinese-resources/documents/white-paper-
chinas-foreign-trade-december-2011/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
4   YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1996).  
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preferred method for foreign parties to resolve their legal disputes in China, 
due in large part to the distrust these parties have of Chinese courts.5 
Nonetheless, parties must recognize that China’s arbitration system is 
very young.  Although commercial arbitration started in the 1950s, the first 
arbitration law, the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, 
hereinafter Arbitration Law, is only twenty years old.6   In contrast, the 
United States has a long history of arbitration.  The U.S. Congress passed 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.7  The FAA provides that if 
there is an arbitration clause, the court shall, on application of one of the 
parties, stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has taken place.8  In 
recent years, U.S. courts have expanded the range of enforceable arbitration 
agreements to include agreements that cover areas of law previously thought 
to be within the exclusive domain of courts.9 
 Parties from different nations tend to seek arbitration in order to 
prevent an abundance of jurisdictional problems. 10   Unlike litigation, 
arbitration provides a neutral venue for international disputes and aims to 
ensure procedural fairness for both parties.11  Arbitration permits parties 
from different countries to exercise a great deal of control over how a 
dispute will be resolved.12  The parties are free to tailor the proceedings to 
meet their needs.  Specifically, parties can contract to govern all disputes by 
a certain set of laws or procedures.13  They decide the scope and content of 
the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose the location of the 
arbitration by specifying these stipulations in the arbitration agreement.14  
Most importantly, parties have the power to choose the decision maker.15  
This freedom to select the arbitrator is why arbitration has been described as 
                                                      
5  Michael I. Kaplan, Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality When Arbitrating in China: How the 
Lessons of the Soviet Union and Iran Can Provide Solutions to Western Parties Arbitrating in China, 110 
PENN ST. L. REV. 769, 780 (2006). 
6   Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 
1994, effective Aug. 31, 1994) available at http:www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383756.htm [hereinafter Arbitration Law]. 
7   Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (1947). 
8   Id. §§ 2–4 (1947). 
9   For example, the disputes in respect of securities and antitrust laws are now deemed arbitrable. 
Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 
1279, 1279 (1999–2000). 
10  Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational 
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (1997). 
11   See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). 
12   DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 4, at 273. 
13   See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518. 
14   See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 5 (2d ed. 1991). 
15  IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §3.2 (1st ed. 1995). 
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“hiring your own private judge.”16  Arbitration benefits parties not only by 
ensuring procedural fairness, but also by providing predictability, lowering 
attorney fees, and increasing the privacy and expertise in decision making.17  
The finality of arbitration is another advantage, which is often attractive for 
its speed and cost-effectiveness.18  Arbitral awards are final and binding, and 
can be enforced in the same manner as court judgments.19  Particularly with 
the well-functioning international enforcement system under the 1958 New 
York Convention,20 arbitral awards are often easier to enforce than court 
judgments. 21   With its acceptance and popularization, international 
commercial arbitration now plays a very important role in settling private 
conflicts.  
Arbitrator bias, however, negates many of the benefits of arbitration to 
commercial parties. 22   In China, where bribery of public officials is 
prevalent, arbitral awards might also be tainted by bribery.23  For instance, 
Jiang Hanwu, the former vice chairman of the Arbitration Commission in 
Lian Yun Gang city, Jiangsu Province, was charged with bribery in 2001.24  
The increased risk that Western parties may incur in this aspect of relations 
with Chinese parties increases the importance of ensuring the impartiality of 
the arbitrators deciding their disputes.25  The issue of arbitrator impartiality 
is therefore critical to the development of arbitration rules and cannot be 
ignored in the process of international private dispute resolution.  The 
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration relies heavily upon the 
thoroughness of arbitration institutions as well as the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators.  
                                                      
16  MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:01 at 1 (3d ed. 2001). 
17  See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Ending Arbitration's Finality through Functional 
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 157–60 (2002–2003). 
18  See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematic Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REV. 
847, 853–54 (1995–1996). 
19  See ZHAO XIUWEN, GUOJISHANGSHI ZHONGCAIFA (国际商事仲裁法) [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION LAW] 5 (2004). 
20  See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
21  See Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A Proposal, 39 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 607, 632 (1998–99). 
22  Kaplan, supra note 5, at 778. 
23  See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, Wangfa Zhongcaide Ruzui Zhengdangxing Fenxi (枉法仲裁的
入罪正当性分析) [The Analysis of the Legitimacy of Distortion of Arbitration Law], in HEXIE SHEHUI DE 
XINGFA XIANSHI WENTI (和谐社会的刑法现实问题) [THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL LAW IN A 
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY] 1758 (Li Jie et al. eds., 2007). 
24  Id. 
25  Kaplan, supra note 5, at 782. 
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While Chinese arbitration has seen remarkable progress in a relatively 
short period of time,26 many problems remain.27  Among those problems is 
the issue of biased arbitrators.  This article focuses on criminal liability for 
biased arbitrators.  Criminal liability is largely prompted by a provision 
titled Wangfa Zhongcai Zui (Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”),28 which 
was added to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China29 in 2006 
by Amendment VI (hereinafter the Amendment), an amendment designed to 
punish biased arbitrators for their wrongdoings. 30   This article critically 
examines the legal regime of arbitrator impartiality in China, including this 
provision, and puts forward some proposals for reform.  Part II provides a 
brief description of the framework of the Chinese arbitration.  Part III 
presents a background of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law;” examines the 
debate on the criminal statute; compares it with some provisions of U.S. 
arbitration laws; and explores the relative Chinese legal culture, tradition, 
and economic environment factors that underlie criminal liability of 
arbitrators.  Part IV gives evaluations from a jurisprudential perspective and 
offers some reform proposals, borrowing from U.S. experience.  The article 
argues that the criminal liability should be limited only to the neutral 
arbitrator and that a detailed definition is needed when applying the law.  
Finally, Part V provides a summary, along with concluding remarks. 
II. THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA 
Arbitration is by nature quasi-private and procedurally more flexible 
than judicial mechanisms.31  This allows arbitrators to work quickly and 
                                                      
26  See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1; see 
also Introduction to the Beijing Arbitration Commission, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 
http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
27  For example, ad hoc arbitration is not legally recognized by Chinese law, and there are different 
criteria for judicial review of arbitral awards between domestic and international arbitration.  See ZHAO 
XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 512-13, 518.  See also infra Part II. 
28 Article 20 of this Amendment inserted Article 399 (I) after Article 399 of the Criminal Law, which 
is titled “Arbitration by ‘Perversion of Law.’”  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzhengan (liu) 
(中华人民共和国刑法修正案(六)) [Amendment VI to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2006, effective June 29, 2006) 
(China), art. 20, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388005.htm. 
[hereinafter The Amendment].   
29  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. July 1, 1979, effective Mar. 14, 1997) 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm [hereinafter 
Criminal Law]. 
30  See generally The Amendment, supra note 28.  For a detailed description of the provision, see 
infra Part III.  
31  ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 6. 
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more efficiently, which is very important for time-sensitive commercial 
arrangements.32  Meanwhile, it provides parties with other advantages, such 
as greater certainty and a higher level of expertise than the court-based 
system.33  Arbitration mitigates the jurisdictional disputes amongst parties.34  
International commercial arbitration has long been regarded as an effective 
choice-of-forum mechanism to resolve international commercial disputes.35  
Due to the near-universal acceptance of the New York Convention,36 parties 
cannot resolve their disputes in multiple forums if one party contests the 
decision of the arbitral tribunal because the Convention provides for the 
confirmation of arbitration awards in member nations.37  This section will 
examine the two categories of arbitration in the People’s Republic of China:  
international commercial arbitration and domestic arbitration.38   
International commercial arbitration started in 1956 with the 
establishment of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (“CIETAC”). 39   In 1959, the China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission (“CMAC”) was set up.40  Both CIETAC and CMAC regulate 
international commercial arbitration, or foreign-related arbitration,41 because 
they were designed to handle disputes arising from economic, trading, 
                                                      
32  For example, the lack of an appeal process in arbitration gives parties expedited finality in their 
legal disputes.  See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004) (limiting judicial review of arbitration awards to a few very 
narrow situations); see also New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. 5 (narrowly restricting the 
situations where a member nation may not confirm an arbitration award). 
33  See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 36. 
34  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 332. 
35  ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 9-10. 
36  China has been a member of the Convention since 1987.  See New York Convention Countries, 
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-
contracting-states (last visited Feb. 4. 2014).  
37  Article V of the New York Convention provides the limited reasons why parties to the Convention 
should not confirm an arbitration award.  See New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. 5. 
38  China has adopted a “two-track” system for domestic arbitration and international commercial 
arbitration.  In the Arbitration Law, Chapter VII, entitled “Special Provisions for Arbitration Involving 
Foreign Elements,” has been set forth to deal with international commercial arbitration, which is also 
known as foreign-related arbitration.  The two types of arbitration are distinct.  For example, the Foreign-
related arbitration commissions are established differently from Arbitration commissions (domestic 
arbitration).  Article 66 provides:  “[f]oreign-related arbitration commissions may be organized and 
established by the China Chamber of International Commerce.”  Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 66.  
Article 10 states:  “[a]rbitration commissions may be established in municipalities directly under the 
Central Government and in cities that are the seats of the people's governments of provinces or autonomous 
regions.  They may also be established in other cities divided into districts, according to need.  Id. at art. 10.  
Arbitration commissions shall not be established at each level of the administrative divisions.  See id.  
People's governments of the cities referred to in the preceding paragraph shall arrange for the relevant 
departments and chambers of commerce to organize arbitration commissions in a unified manner.”  See id. 
39 The history of CIETAC and its arbitration rules can be found at CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
40   See CHINA MARITIME ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cmac-sh.org/en/home.asp (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
41   See id.; CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1. 
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transportation, and maritime activities involving a foreign element.42  The 
arbitration rules and practices of CMAC are virtually identical to those of 
CIETAC, so examination of the CIETAC rules and practices will suffice to 
demonstrate the nature of Chinese international commercial arbitration.43  In 
accordance with its rules, disputes arising between Chinese parties and/or 
parties from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan, or between Chinese-foreign 
joint ventures and Chinese parties, are within CIETAC’s jurisdiction. 44  
CIETAC is well-developed—it permits foreign arbitrators to be included in 
the panel of arbitrators, 45  a fact that has helped to bring the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules more in line with recognized international standards.46  
However, a significant problem of cross-pollination appeared in 1996, which 
resulted in ambiguity surrounding CIETAC's jurisdiction. 
In contrast, domestic arbitration has a shorter history.  With the 
promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994, domestic local arbitration 
commissions were gradually established mainly for resolving domestic 
economic contract disputes or cases without foreign elements.47  In fact, 
there are other arbitration mechanisms available to some special domestic 
disputes.  For instance, employment disputes, 48 some intellectual property 
rights disputes,49 and securities disputes50 are not arbitrated pursuant to the 
                                                      
42   See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 65. 
43    See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 35.  
44  See China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3, 
2012, effective May 1, 2012), art. 3, available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms. 
45   See id., at art. 24. 
46   See Ge Jun, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of 
China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 133 (1996). 
47   For example, the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) was founded on September 28, 1995, 
following the passage of the Arbitration Law.  See BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 26. 
48  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May. 1, 2008) 
[hereinafter Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law], art. 2, available at 
http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs.  Article 2 of the Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
states:  “[t]his Law is applicable to the following labor disputes arising between employing units and 
workers within the territory of the People's Republic of China.”  Id. Article 5 states, “[w]here a labor 
dispute arises and the parties are not willing to have a consultation, or the consultation fails, or the 
settlement agreement reached is not performed, they may apply to a mediation institution for mediation.  
Where the parties are not willing to have mediation, or the mediation fails, or the mediation agreement 
reached is not performed, they may apply to a labor-dispute arbitration commission for arbitration.  Where 
they are dissatisfied with the arbitral award, they may initiate litigation to a people's court, unless otherwise 
provided for in this Law.”  Id. at art. 5. 
49  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, 
effective Dec. 1, 2001, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2013, effective 
May. 1, 2014), art 41, available at http://npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384018.htm 
[hereinafter Trademark Law].  This article deals with Decisions on Registered Trademark Disputes, which 
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Arbitration Law, but submitted to arbitration by reason of other specific 
laws.  Since these types of disputes are not commercial by nature and those 
tribunals (Labor-dispute Arbitration Commissions, Trademark Review and 
Adjudication Board, and State Council Securities Committee) are more like 
administrative organs,51 they do not fall within the scope of this article.  
However, a State Council Notice dramatically changed CIETAC’s 
long-standing exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes.52  Article 
3 of the State Council Notice provides that domestic arbitration commissions 
now “have the power to accept foreign-related arbitrations when the parties 
have agreed to submit disputes to such Arbitration Commissions.”53  On the 
other hand, according to the newly revised 2005 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, 
CIETAC can also accept cases involving domestic disputes.54  This allows 
cross-pollinization between foreign-related arbitration matters with domestic 
arbitration commissions and domestic disputes with CIETAC.  Indeed, the 
ambiguity of those provisions appears to be a source of conflict.55 
                                                                                                                                                              
provides:  “[n]otwithstanding the preceding two paragraphs, if a registered trademark is in dispute, an 
application may be filed for decision with the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board within five years 
of the date when that trademark is approved to be registered.”  Id. 
50  See Guiro Faxingyu Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (股票发行与交易管理暂行条例) [Interim Regulations on 
the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks] (promulgated by State Council, Apr. 22, 1993, 
effective Apr. 22, 1993), art. 80, available at http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs [hereinafter Stocks 
Regulations].  This article provides that “[d]isputes between securities dealing institutions or between a 
securities dealing institution and a security exchange on the issuance or trading of shares shall be resolved 
through mediation or arbitration under the auspices of an arbitration organ that has been established with 
the approval of the SCSC or designated by the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC).” Id.  
51  For example, the administrative department of labor under the State Council formulates arbitration 
rules and the administrative departments of labor of the province governments provide guidance in labor-
dispute arbitration within their own administrative areas.  A labor-dispute arbitration commission is 
composed of representatives of the administrative department of labor, the trade unions and the enterprises.  
See Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, supra note 48, art. 18-19.  The State Council's 
administrative department for industry and commerce establishes a Trademark Review and Adjudication 
Board to be responsible for handling trademark disputes.  See Trademark Law, supra note 49, at art. 2.  
SCSC is the agency in charge of the national securities market and is responsible for the unified 
administration of securities markets throughout China in accordance with the provisions of laws and 
regulations.  See Stocks Regulations, supra note 50, art. 5. 
52  GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CIRCULAR OF THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE 
COUNCIL REGARDING SOME PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE CLARIFIED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
ARBITRATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1996), 
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/Laws/47607b541f984c7f001.cms (last visited February 4, 2014) 
[hereinafter CIRCULAR]. 
53   Article 3 of the State Council Notice provides: “[t]he functions and duties of newly established 
arbitration commissions are mainly to arbitrate domestic disputes; they may accept foreign-related cases if 
the parties concerned make such choice. Newly established arbitration commissions shall adopt identical 
charging standards for arbitration of either domestic or foreign-related disputes.”  CIRCULAR, supra note 
52, at art. 3.  See also Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 346. 
54  CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 
art. 3. 
55  See Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 347. 
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Another notable distinction between domestic and foreign-related 
arbitration is the difference in criteria required for judicial review of arbitral 
awards.  The Chinese courts, which are officially named the People’s Courts, 
can review not only procedural issues, but also the legal reasoning 
supporting the domestic arbitral awards. 56   Conversely, in international 
arbitrations the courts are not allowed to consider the legal merits to 
overturn an award.  Instead, the courts generally scrutinize procedural 
issues,57 a practice that conforms to the New York Convention.58 
Generally speaking, China’s international arbitral tribunals are better 
established and more sophisticated than their domestic counterparts.59  “It is 
important that they remain distinct from domestic arbitral tribunals, which 
do not share CIETAC’s reputation.”60  In accordance with the New York 
Convention, CIETAC awards are recognized and enforced in more than 140 
countries. 61   CIETAC’s nearly 20,000 concluded arbitration cases have 
involved parties from more than seventy countries and regions outside the 
Chinese mainland, and its awards have been recognized and enforced in 
more than sixty countries and regions.62  Since 1990, CIETAC’s caseload 
has been one of the heaviest among the world’s major arbitration 
institutions.63  However, the current two-track system can also create some 
                                                      
56  If a party can prove that evidence on the basis of which the award was made had been forged, or 
that the other party withheld evidence sufficient to have an impact on the impartiality of arbitration, the 
first party may submit an application for vacation of the award.  See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 
58. 
57  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 274  (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, 
effective Apr. 9, 1992, amended for the second  time by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], available at 
http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs. 
58  Similar provisions can be found in the Convention.  See New York Convention, supra note 20, 
art. 5. 
59  For example, a foreign-related arbitration commission may appoint arbitrators from among 
foreigners with special knowledge in the fields of law, economy and trade, science and technology, etc.  
See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 67.  The foreign arbitrator may serve as a check on the arbitration 
process to assure that it is fairly and impartially conducted.  See Ge Jun, supra note 46, at 133. 
60  As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of China’s arbitration is its “two-track” system 
under which the foreign-related arbitration (or international commercial arbitration) is treated differently 
from domestic arbitration.  The international commercial arbitration is more in-line with international 
norms and practices than domestic arbitration.  Therefore, the international arbitral tribunals remain distinct 
from domestic ones.  See supra note 37, at 58.  See also Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 338.  
61   See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1. 
62   Id. 
63  See id. 
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ambiguity and fear that a foreign arbitrator might be found criminally liable 
one day.64 
III. THE CRIMINAL PROVISION OF ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION OF LAW” 
On June 29, 2006, at its twenty-second meeting, China’s legislature, 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, adopted and 
promulgated an important piece of law:  Amendment VI to the Criminal 
Law of the People's Republic of China (the “Amendment”).65  Although the 
absence of arbitrator regulation seems astonishing, the passage of this 
Chinese criminal provision indicates that only the most rigorous law, 
criminal law, is sufficient to regulate the arbitrator liability system in China.  
Under this law, biased arbitrators are subject to criminal liability:  
 
Where a person, who is charged by law with the duty of 
arbitration, intentionally runs counter to facts and laws and 
twists the law when making a ruling in arbitration, if the 
circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal 
detention; and if the circumstances are especially serious, he 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
three years but not more than seven years.66 
 
Nevertheless, it does not suggest that the criminal approach is defect free.  In 
order to provide insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the provision 
and context for an evaluation of the law in the next section, this section 
examines A) the background of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” B) 
current debates, C) the U.S. experience of arbitrators’ impartiality, and D) 
the historical development of China’s legal system. 
A.  Background of the Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” Criminal 
Provision 
International arbitration developed as an alternative form of dispute 
resolution because of a fear that foreign courts would be biased in favor of 
local parties, yet the impartiality of international arbitration itself is also 
                                                      
64  See Xu Qianquan, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Zhi Pipan (枉法仲裁罪之批判) [A Criticism of Law-bending 
Arbitration], 3 GUANGXI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO ZHEXUE SHEHUIXUE BAN (广西民族学院学报哲学社会学) 
［J. OF GUANGXI U. FOR NATIONALITIES] 120, 124 (2006). 
65  See The Amendment, supra note 28, at art. 20. 
66  Id. 
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important.67  In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbitration process, 
the arbitral institution must ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator.68  Thus, 
having a neutral and impartial arbitrator to resolve commercial disputes is a 
fundamental goal in modern arbitration.69  In response to this goal, states 
throughout the world enacted laws to deal with the arbitrator responsibility 
in domestic and international arbitration. 70   Surprisingly, rather than 
following the policy of developed nations, China’s legal policy on partiality 
seems to take a slightly different track.  Vacatur and refusal to implement an 
arbitral award are the universal ways to deal with partiality of international 
arbitration.71  These approaches are also used in China, but the Arbitration 
by “Perversion of Law” provision uniquely imposes criminal liability on 
biased arbitrators.72 
In debating the Amendment, many arbitration scholars openly 
objected to the inclusion of the provision because holding arbitrators 
criminally liable does not comply with international practices. 73  
Nevertheless, fears of arbitrators mishandling power and of a threat to 
justice prevailed over objections.74  The provision falls within the category 
of crimes regarding dereliction of duty.75  Article 399 of the Criminal Law 
pertains to dereliction of duties of judicial personnel.  This article was 
formally named Civil and Administrative Judgment by “Perversion of 
                                                      
67 See YU XIFU, GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI DE SIFAJIANDUYU XIEZHU (国际商事仲裁的司法监督与协助）
[THE JUDICIAL SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] 80–81 
(2006).  
68  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991). 
69  See YU XIFU, supra note 67, at 80. 
70  See Liu Xiaohong, Queding Zhongcaiyuan Zeren Zhidu de Fali Sikao (确定仲裁员责任制度的法理思
考) [Jurisprudence Analysis of the Establishment of Arbitrators’ Liability], 5 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE 
XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [J. E. CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L.] 82, 85 (2007). 
71   See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 454.  
72  See Song Lianbin, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Pipan (枉法仲裁罪批判) [A Critical Analysis of the Crime of 
Distortion of Arbitration Law], 62 BEIJING ZHONGCAI (北京仲裁) [ARB.BEIJING] 22, 32 (2007).  Besides 
China, similar criminal provisions for biased arbitrators can be found in Japan and Taiwan.  See Keihō 
(Keihō) [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 197 (Japan); Republic of China Criminal Law, art. 124 (Taiwan), translated at 
law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawSearchNo.aspxNo.aaspx?PC=C0000001&DF=&SNo=124.  See also Luo 
Guoqiang, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Sibian (枉法仲裁罪思辨) [Thoughts on the Crime of Distortion of the Law of 
Arbitration], 1 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志) [J. CHINA’S CRIM. LAW] 63, 71 (2009). 
73  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 32. 
74  See Xu Li, On Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Lifa Zhengdangxing Tantao (枉法仲裁罪的立法正当性探讨) 
[Research About Its Legislative Righteousness Of Crime Of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 5 FAXUE 
ZAZHI (法学杂志) [LEGAL STUD. MAG.] 85, 88 (2009). 
75  Chapter IX of Criminal Law, which covers article 397 to article 419, is named Crimes of 
Dereliction of Duty.  See Criminal Law, supra note 29. 
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Law.”76  The purported legislative purpose of the criminal provision is to 
regulate arbitrators’ conduct and guarantee fairness and justice in the course 
of arbitration, which was previously considered a legal loophole.77  Because 
arbitration competes with litigation, supporters contended that an arbitrator 
should be similarly liable as a judge if he bends the law.78  Considering that 
judges are criminally liable for biased rulings, it was unreasonable, 
supporters contended, for arbitrators to escape a similar punishment. 79  
Notwithstanding so much criticism about the criminal provision,80 the worry 
that an arbitrator might misuse his power formed a sound basis for the 
provision, as this worry is prominent in China.81 
Arbitration became a popular means of dispute resolution only after 
institutional reform and a growing openness to meet the needs of its rapidly 
growing economy. 82  As an import from the West, arbitration is still new to a 
large portion of China’s population. 83  Unlike the Western tradition of “rule 
of law,”84 China has a unique tradition termed guanxi (rule of relationship).85  
Guanxi means a complex web of informal personal connections.  The 
concept is a type of gift economy that involves the “cultivation of personal 
networks of mutual dependence and trust.” 86   Someone seeking and 
maintaining guanxi directly or indirectly with those who have authority over 
social resources, no matter by what means, has a massive advantage, as the 
latter would repay the former in the future according to the “rule of 
                                                      
76  Article 399 of the Criminal Law provides:  “ [i]n civil or administrative proceedings, any judicial 
officer who intentionally runs counter to the facts and law and twists the law when rendering judgments or 
orders, . . . shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention.   
If any judicial officer who takes a bribe and bends the law, which also constitutes a crime as provided for in 
Article 385 (Bribery) of [the Criminal Law], he shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the 
provisions for a heavier punishment.”  The Amendment, supra note 28, at art. 20. 
77  See Chen Zhongqian, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Sheli Danghuan (论枉法仲裁罪的设立当缓) [On 
To Delay Setting up the Crime of Distorting the Law of Arbitration], 7 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
(仲裁研究专论) [ARB. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE)] 1, 2 (2006). 
78  Id.  
79  See YU XIFU, supra note 67, at 88. 
80  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72. 
81  See id, at 32–33. 
82  China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3, 
2012, effective May 1, 2012), available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms. 
83  See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 20. 
84   In Western societies, law is an end in itself, above and separate from government.  The law 
protects the rights of citizens and permits those citizens to shape their conduct in the knowledge that the 
law will be applied fairly, consistently, and predictably.  See generally James Hugo Friend, Foreword the 
Rocky Road toward the Rule of Law in China: 1979-2000, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 369, 374 (2000). 
85  Carol A. G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal 
Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 195, 197 (1994). 
86  Id. 
354 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 2 
 
guanxi.”87  The “rule of guanxi,” also operative in other Asian societies, 
appears to make it challenging for parties to find a mutually accepted “fair” 
arbitrator, and even the selection of an arbitral institution problematic 
because parties distrust each other. 88   In practice, there is the risk of 
arbitrators taking bribes and ruling wrongfully.89  The worry whether the 
other party has guanxi with arbitrators makes the question of the arbitrators’ 
impartiality much more important.  This problem is disconcerting because it 
might lead to a cooling in commerce between China and foreign nations.  
That is not the outcome China presently wants to encourage. 90   Thus, 
understandably, due to lack of arbitrator ethics, criminal responsibility is 
appropriate in the case of a biased arbitrator.91  As the culture of guanxi has 
the potential to influence arbitrators and calls their neutrality into question, 
the criminal liability provision was enacted as an attempt to ensure the 
impartiality of the arbitrators. 
A significant consequence of the provision is that it changes the way 
arbitral awards are judicially reviewed.  The power of courts and public 
prosecutors will inevitably be expanded to review the merits of an arbitral 
award,92 which is beyond the standard of procedural review according to the 
New York Convention.93  In the Chinese criminal justice system, one of the 
important aspects is the dichotomy drawn between public prosecution and 
private prosecution. 94   Criminal cases are publicly prosecuted with the 
                                                      
87  See HUANG GUANGGUO, RUJIA GUANXI ZHUYI (儒家关系主义) [ CONFUCIAN RELATIONALISM] 
12 (2006). 
88  See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1758. 
89  Zhang Yong & Huang Xiaohua, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui Yu Shouhuizui De Jinghe (论枉法仲裁罪
与受贿罪的竞合) [On the Overlap of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” and Bribery], 5 FAXUEPINGLUN (法
学评论) [LAW REV.] 120, 120 (2008). 
90  Fan Mingchao, Shangshi Zhongcai Shiyexia de Wangfa Caijuezui (商事仲裁视野下的枉法裁决罪) 
[Crime of Distortion of the Law of Arbitration under the Vision of Commercial Arbitration], 27 
HEBEIFAXUE (河北法学) [HEBEI LAW SCIENCE] 125, 129 (2009). 
91  See Luo Guoqiang, supra note 72, at 71. 
92   See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35. 
93  See New York Convention, supra note 20. 
94  Both public prosecution and private prosecution can result in criminal punishment.  Public 
prosecution occurs when the proceedings are initiated by the People’s Procuratorates with the People’s 
Courts, while in privation prosecution it is the victim, the victim’s legal representative, close relative, or 
others who are entitled to initiate the proceedings and file a criminal case with the People’s Courts.  See 
CHEN ZEXIAN, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW 163 (2009).  All cases requiring initiation of a public 
prosecution shall be examined for decision by the People's Procuratorates.  See ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUO XING SHI SU SONG FA (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China], art. 167 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, 
amended for the second time by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 
Criminal Procedure Law], available at http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs. 
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exception of three categories of less serious crimes.95  In the former cases, 
the public prosecutors, named People’s Procuratorates, bear the evidentiary 
burden before the courts.96  In the latter, similar to civil litigation, the private 
prosecutor (often the victim himself) is obligated to prove the wrongdoing of 
the accused.97  Since a crime of dereliction of duty is a public prosecution 
case,98 it is the People’s Procuratorates rather than the claimants who must 
prove the crime.  Before bringing cases to the court, the Procuratorates will 
be given the chance to substantially review the arbitral award because they 
need to investigate and collect evidence.99  In turn, the court has to review 
the merits of the arbitration again in order to make a decision.  This conflicts 
with China’s obligation of procedural review under the New York 
Convention. 
B. The Debate Surrounding the Criminal Provision 
The criminal provision established the institutional framework for the 
imposition of penal punishment on biased arbitrators.  However, it raised a 
host of complicated questions as well, which became the subject of national 
debate.  The questions concerned the nature of arbitration, the feasibility of 
the criminal provision, whether the law is in line with international practice, 
and the appropriate legal responsibility, criminal responsibility, or civil 
liability, for the biased arbitrator.  
                                                      
95  Cases of private prosecution include the following:  1) cases to be handled only upon complaint; 
2) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that those are minor criminal cases; and 3) cases for 
which the victims have evidence to prove that the defendants should be investigated for criminal 
responsibility according to law because their acts have infringed upon the victim’s personal or property 
rights, whereas, the public security organs or the People’s Procuratorates do not investigate the criminal 
responsibility of the accused.  See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at art. 170. 
96  During the course of a criminal case, the People’s Procuratorates have the ability to exercise four 
major powers.  First, they have the right to investigate criminal cases assigned to them by the law, and to 
take all kinds of coercive measures against suspects.  Second, they examine cases submitted by the police 
organs and decide whether to approve arrest or to prosecute suspects.  Third, they have the right to 
prosecute suspects, and to protest the judgments.  Lastly, as a law supervisory organ, they have the right to 
supervise all the criminal processes, including investigation, interrogation, trial, and execution.  See WANG 
GUIGUO & JOHN MO, CHINESE LAW 648 (1999). 
97  Id. at 652.  The burden of proof in a private prosecution case is on the prosecutor.  If he lacks 
criminal evidence and cannot present supplementary evidence, the People’s Court shall persuade him to 
withdraw the private prosecution or order its rejection.  See also Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at 
art. 171(2). 
98  In cases involving crimes of corruption and dereliction of duty, the People’s Procurates shall 
conduct the investigation and initiate a public prosecution.  See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at 
art. 136. 
99  See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 124. 
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1.  Arguments Against Criminalization of Arbitrator Bias 
Prior to the legislation, the issue of penal punishment upon a biased 
arbitrator had been at the heart of the discussion of the liability of arbitrators 
and received a wide range of practical and academic attention.100  While the 
criminal statute was an effort to fill the legal gap of liability for arbitrators, 
many arbitration scholars have denounced the statute as having fallen short 
of its goal.101  They argued that the criminal responsibility of an arbitrator is 
not in line with international practice, as it disregards the contractual nature 
of arbitration.102  Additionally, the vague wording makes the workability of 
the criminal statute problematic.103 
Arbitration is seen first as a matter of contract rather than a form of 
adjudication.104  One of the continuing debates is indeed whether contract 
traits rather than judicature characteristics form the cornerstone of, and 
exercise pervading influence over, arbitration. 105   Critics argue that 
analogizing arbitration to litigation may be arbitrary and imprecise.106  A 
common objection to the criminal statute is that it is against the nature of 
arbitration.107  It is important to understand that arbitration is not litigation 
with another name.108  An arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a 
judge, yet there are critical differences between judges and arbitrators.  
Arbitrators charge fees from the parties, whereas judges, as state personnel, 
receive wages from the state budget.109  Further, arbitrators are often experts 
chosen from the same industry in which the dispute arises, and are not 
always required to have a legal education.110  Rooted within international 
trade, disputants have chosen arbitration to settle controversies for hundreds 
of years.111  It is the participants who shape the arbitration, which is then 
                                                      
100  See Lu Jing, Zhongcai Youxian Xingshi Zeren Chengdan (仲裁有限刑事责任承担) [On Limited 
Criminal Liability for Distortion of the Law of Arbitration], 24 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB.STUDY] 
82 (2010).  See also Liu, supra note 42, at 89. 
101  See Liu Xiaohong, supra note 70, at 88–90.  
102  Chen Zhongqian, supra note 77, at 2–3. 
103  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 26–31. 
104  Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997). 
105  Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 120–21. 
106  As a matter of contract, arbitration is influenced by the respective bargaining strength of each 
party.  Thus, party-appointed arbitrators are a reflection of the parties' positions in the dispute.  See Rau, 
supra note 103, at 511.  See also Chen Zhongqian, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Rending I (论枉法裁决罪的认
定(上)) [On When Should the Court Find a Violation of Arbitration Law I], 24 ZHONGCAIYANJIU (仲裁研究) 
[ARB. STUDY] 72, 76 (2011). 
107  Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 77. 
108  See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 121. 
109  See id. 
110  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 33, 35. 
111  See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 2–3 . 
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recognized by a state’s legal system through various private dispute 
resolutions. 112   The rationale behind arbitration is the doctrine of party 
autonomy:  parties’ consent to address issues through arbitration should be 
respected and enforced such that neither of the parties can initiate judicial 
proceedings before the arbitration takes place.113 
Opponents of the criminal statute also argue that judicial policy 
should not allow public intervention in the private domain when parties have 
mutually agreed to exercise their autonomy to arbitrate.114  Under this view,  
arbitrators’ authority comes from the authorization of the parties instead of 
the state because the private parties have the natural right of self-
regulation. 115   Therefore, the nature of arbitration should be deemed a 
product of contract between the parties and the arbitrators rather than a form 
of judicature, and as a legal service rather than a form of judicial power.116  
This is particularly important, as one goal of international arbitration is to 
limit state influence on the dispute resolution process between and among 
international parties. 117   Otherwise, the expected benefits of arbitration 
would be dramatically reduced.118 
Additionally, critics doubt that the criminal statute is workable 
because of the ambiguity of the provision.119  It is highly likely that in 
practice the criminal statute will not function as expected because the 
language in the Amendment offers little guidance as to what particular 
conducts constitute the crime. 120   For instance, the first challenge is to 
establish how the criminal statute covers the accused.  Although the person 
who commits the crime is referred to as “a person who is charged by law 
with the duty of arbitration,” the term “person” is far from clear.121  The 
description covers both arbitrators and any other personnel working in 
arbitration commissions,122 which has caused some practical difficulties.123  
                                                      
112  Id. 
113  Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 73. 
114  Id. at 76. 
115  See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 77, at 3. 
116  Id. 
117  See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 17. 
118  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36. 
119  See id, at 26-31.  
120  Id. at 35. 
121  See Xu Qianquan, Zhongcaiyuan Falv Zeren Zhi Jiantao II (仲裁员法律责任之检讨(下)) [The 
Criticism of Arbitrators Legal Responsibility II], 11 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB. STUDY] 25 (2006). 
122  For example, “anyone” can also refer to the chairman of an arbitration commission in accordance 
with the provision.  For example, the Arbitration Law states:  “Whereas the parties concerned agree that the 
arbitration tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators, each of them shall choose one arbitrator or the 
appointment to the chairman of the arbitration commission, with the third arbitrator jointly chosen by the 
parties concerned or appointed by the chairman of the arbitration commission jointly entrusted by the two 
parties.  The third arbitrator shall be the chief arbitrator.”  Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 31. 
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Furthermore, an arbitral award is often made on the basis of the majority 
opinion among the arbitrators and dissenters need not provide a signature on 
the award.124  Suppose some arbitrators showed signs of bias and others 
appeared objective.125  It would be unjust if an arbitrator who disagreed and 
refused to sign was included as “person” and found guilty of Arbitration by 
“Perversion of Law.”126 
Second, defining intentionally is another fundamental issue.  Neither 
the Amendment itself nor the Arbitration Law provides detailed rules about 
how intentionality should be ascertained. 127   By including this word, it 
appeared to have precluded a negligent act.128  But it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to draw a line between an arbitrator’s intentional disregard of 
law and a negligent mistake in the process of handling a case because it is 
not easy for the court to discern an arbitrator’s intentions.129  In practice, 
what satisfies intentionally is subject to interpretation.130 
Third, the problem of explaining the expression “runs counter to facts 
and laws” is particularly severe and disconcerting.131  The use of the word 
“and” indicates that the crime exists only when both of the two conditions, 
“runs counter to the facts” and “runs counter to the laws,” are satisfied.132  
The enactment is silent about whether a crime exists when only one 
condition is fulfilled.133  Further, as previously shown, both CIETAC and 
domestic arbitration commissions have jurisdiction over international or 
foreign-related disputes.134  Following international practice, parties often 
choose what law they want to govern interpretation and enforcement of their 
                                                                                                                                                              
123  Xu Qianquan, supra note 121, at 25. 
124  Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 53-54. 
125  See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 78. 
126  See id. 
127  For the argument that the Arbitration Law provided no guidance for the application of the new 
enactment.  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29–30. 
128  An intentional crime is a crime committed with clear knowledge that the act will cause socially 
dangerous consequences, and hopes for or is indifferent to those consequences.  Intentional crimes always 
result in criminal liability.  However, a negligent crime occurs when an act, or a foreseeable act, may cause 
socially dangerous consequences but continues in the action out of carelessness.  Alternatively, a negligent 
crime occurs when the actor has foreseen the consequences but erroneously assumes he can prevent them, 
resulting in such consequences.  Criminal liability is imposed for negligent crimes only when the law so 
stipulates.  See Criminal Law, supra note 29, at art. 14–15. 
129  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29-30.  See also Lu Jing, supra note 100, at 84.  
130  Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29.   
131  See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 105, at 78.106 
132  Fan, supra note 90, at 127. 
133  Id. 
134  See China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3, 
2012, effective May 1, 2012), art. 3, available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms.   See also 
CIRCULAR, supra note 52, at art. 3. 
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agreement.135  Sometimes, in amicable arbitration or ad hoc arbitration, no 
applicable law is selected and arbitrators are empowered to disregard the 
strictures of legal rules in search of more equitable resolutions to disputes.136  
Therefore, what specific law do they refer to in these situations?  If the 
applicable law is a foreign law, it is questionable whether Chinese courts 
have the competent jurisdiction to make a decision that an arbitral award 
“runs counter to” a foreign law.137  Admittedly, such a decision on a foreign 
law would constitute an infringement of sovereignty of a foreign country in 
violation of a basic international law principle of sovereign equality.138 
Further confusion arises with respect to the clause “if the 
circumstances are extremely serious,” without detailed criteria of those 
serious circumstances. 139   The enactment is silent on this crucial and 
controversial area, which makes it difficult for courts to use the provision in 
deciding what circumstances would be extremely serious.140 
The criminal statute may also be incompatible with China’s 
international obligations.141  As previously outlined, China adopts a two-
track approach to judicial review of arbitral awards, under which Chinese 
courts are not permitted to review any of the legal merits or reasoning except 
procedural issues in international arbitration.142  A verdict of Arbitration by 
“Perversion of Law” requires first of all a substantial judicial review of the 
arbitral award.143  Courts must request that the arbitration panel provide 
reasons justifying its decision in order to judge whether criminal conduct 
exists, but arbitral awards are often rendered without explanation of the 
reasoning or even a complete record of the proceedings.144  Furthermore, a 
domestic arbitration commission now has jurisdiction over both domestic 
                                                      
135  See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974). 
136  See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 5. 
137  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35. 
138  Zhang Junying, Shangshizhongcai Wangfaxingwei de Xingshi Guizhi Yanjiu (商事仲裁枉法行为的刑
事规制研究) [Study on the Criminal Rule of Perversion of Law in Commercial Arbitration], 4 SHANGCHANG 
XIANDAIHUA (商场现代化) [MARKET MODERNIZATION] 311, 311 (2007). 
139  Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 31. 
140  Id. 
141  See Huang Hui, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi “Wangfa” Xing (论枉法仲裁罪之枉法性) [The 
“Perverting” Nature of Law-bending Arbitration], 4 SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO (四川大学学报) [J.SICHUAN 
U.] 120,124 (2010). 
142  See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 57, at art. 274; Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 58. 
143  For a discussion of the specific difficulties brought by the two-track system, see Huang Hui, supra 
note 141, at 124. 
144 See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 54.  A written arbitral award need only specify “the 
arbitration claim, the facts of the dispute, the reasons for the decision, the results of the award, the 
allocation of arbitration fees and the date of the award.”  Id.  The parties can agree to not specify the facts 
of the dispute and the grounds for the award in a written arbitral award.  Id.  A written arbitral award shall 
be signed by the arbitrators and affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission.  Id.  Arbitrators with 
different opinions on the arbitral award may or may not sign the award.  Id. 
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and foreign-related disputes. 145   An arbitrator of a domestic arbitration 
commission handling domestic and foreign-related cases must utilize 
different criteria for judicial review.146  An international arbitrator, who may 
be held criminally liable under domestic criteria, could be immune from 
penal punishment under international standards,147 because in accordance 
with international standards there could be less chance to judicially 
scrutinize the facts and merits, which are essential when an arbitrator is 
found to run counter to the facts.  
In determining whether an arbitrator is guilty, the courts must 
scrutinize the merits and reasoning used in the arbitration proceedings.  
However, in accordance with the New York Convention, the courts of 
member states may only review the procedural issues of international 
commercial arbitration.148  That is to say, the facts and merits, including 
even those with which the arbitrator might be found guilty of the crime, are 
not within the scope of the scrutiny of the courts.  Therefore, it is unlikely 
that international arbitrators would be convicted of the crime, which makes 
judicial review a deterrent only for domestic arbitrators.149  A responsible 
and capable arbitrator would be overly cautious and understandably reluctant 
to risk accepting appointment, which might cause the decline of the quality 
of arbitration and eventually do harm to the development of arbitration as 
well as rule of law efforts in China.150  The language of the Amendment is 
too vague and simplistic to provide any concrete guidelines in practice, and 
there is only a theoretical possibility that a biased arbitrator would be caught 
and convicted of the crime. 151   The law remains theoretical since it is 
difficult to apply in practice.152  Nevertheless, the Amendment has been 
criticized as being over-inclusive.153  Some opine that it only provides moral 
force and that there are already enough rules that prevent arbitrator 
misconduct.154  The existing remedies include application for the withdrawal 
                                                      
145  See CIRCULAR, supra note 52, at art. 3. 
146  See Huang Hui, supra note 141, at 125. 
147  While domestic arbitration is subject to judicial review of facts, arbitral decision-making, and 
international commercial arbitration are immune from substantive scrutiny after an award is made. 
International arbitrators actually do not have a chance to be convicted of “Perversion of Law.”  If 
international arbitrators could be found guilty of this crime, the courts would have to review the merits and 
reasoning in arbitration proceedings first, which means a violation of China’s obligation under the New 
York Convention that courts of member states are only entitled to reviewing the procedural issues of 
international commercial arbitration.  See New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. V 
148  Id. 
149  See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 78. 
150  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35–38. 
151  Id. at 35-36. 
152  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36. 
153  See Lu Jing, supra note 100, at 82, 85. 
154  See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 122-23. 
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and replacement of an arbitrator, application for vacation of the award, 
denial of enforcement of the award, notification of re-arbitrating by the 
tribunal, and rejection of the application. 155   Occasionally, even penal 
punishment can be used.156  Similar provisions are rare.157 
2.  Arguments for Criminalization of Arbitrator Bias 
Despite such criticisms, other experts are concerned with corruption 
and arbitrator misconduct, which concern, for them, justifies the use of 
criminal punishment.158  Many criminal academics and practitioners support 
the use of penal punishment on arbitrators.159  People’s Procuratorates, for 
example, have been strong advocates of the criminal statute.160  To them, the 
idea that no arbitrator should intentionally misuse his power to go against 
facts and laws comes from the notion that both arbitration and litigation are 
the means to resolve civil disputes and they are in essence the same, no 
matter the way in which they are manifested.161   Further, the provision 
would encourage high standards of integrity and lasting confidence in 
arbitration proceedings.162  The arguments for criminalization focus mainly 
                                                      
155  According to the Arbitration Law, arbitration shall be carried out independently and free from 
interference by administrative authorities, social organizations, or individuals; where an arbitrator has 
privately met a party or agent or has accepted an invitation or gift from such party or agent, he must 
withdraw and his name shall be removed from the list of arbitrators; where arbitrators demanded and/or 
accepted bribes, practiced graft or made an arbitral award that perverted the law, a party may submit an 
application for vacation of the award.  See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 8, 34, 38, 58.  Moreover, 
where one or several arbitrators committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or practiced graft, or made an 
award that perverted the law, People’s Courts shall rule to deny execution of the arbitral award.  See Civil 
Procedure Law, supra note 57, at art. 213, 258. 
156  For example, although an arbitrator who accepts a bribe cannot be charged with bribery because 
he is not state personnel, he may be accused of non-state personnel bribery or commercial bribery.  See 
Criminal Law, supra note 29, at art. 163.   
157  One similar criminal provision is found in the 2006 Criminal Law of Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Article 124, which stipulated the crime Decision by Perversion of Law.  As of today, no case has occurred.  
Therefore, some commentators aggressively contend that this fact proves that arbitrator misconduct is a 
severe social problem only in the drafters’ imaginations.  Zhang Wenxian, China’s Rule of Law in the 
Globalization Era, 4 FRONT LAW CHINA 471 (2006) available at 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=y26JxSCXo6RBd8XruUoAB7cuIbB8SOX2YIw_klHeUpGYOGwN-
7HSZuOVIrskXTUUl2KQXYkkzMrzrURwo-PjcewvmLna37U2tCdTQQNYTJ7; See Huang Hui, supra 
note 141, at 126.141 
158  See Luo Guoqiang, supra note 72.  See also Xu Li, supra note 74. 
159 Han Yonghong, Guanyu Wangfa Zhongcai Zhi Sikao: Jiyu Xianshi De Sijiao, (关于枉法仲裁之思考：
基于现实的视角) [Reflection on Criminal Liability of Arbitrators: A realistic Perspective] 26 HAINAN 
DAXUE XUEBAO RENWEN SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (海南大学学报人文社会学版) [HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. J. 
OF HAINAM U.] 144, 145 (2008) (China). 
160  Id. 
161  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88. 
162  See Chen Wei, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Zhuisu Fangshi Zhi Biangengji Tichang (枉法仲裁罪追诉方式之
变更及提倡) [The Change and Advocation of Prosecution of Arbitration by Perversion of Law], 4 ZHONG 
GUO XINGSHI FA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志) [MAG. ON CHINA’S CRIM. SCI.] 57 (2008) (China). 
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on the social harm of arbitrator misbehavior and the quasi-judicial nature of 
arbitration. 163   Some contend that the lack of workability is not a real 
problem because it can be remedied by providing more detailed rules.164  
Proponents also believe that the criminal statute fits within the reality of 
China’s current economic and social situation.165 
Advocates for criminalization emphasize the social harm of corruption 
and misconduct in arbitration.  Since all adjudicators should be neutral when 
making a decision, the social harm of corruption and misconduct in 
arbitration is as serious as in litigation, which is regulated under the 1997 
criminal law as well. 166   As with most legal debates, the issue of the 
appropriateness of a penalty cannot be sensibly examined without taking 
into account the conduct’s social harm.167  In China, social harm is widely 
believed to be a relevant factor in choosing to promulgate a criminal 
statute.168  The concept of giving more consideration to the maintenance of 
social stability has long been accepted. 169   An arbitral award is a final 
binding decision equal to and potentially more final than that of the judiciary 
because an arbitral award is not subject to any appellate review. 170  
Arbitrators are usually free to use their own personal knowledge in making 
decisions and are not obliged to follow rules of evidence.171  Meanwhile, 
courts are generally deferential to an arbitral award and do not review the 
legal merits to overturn it.172  For the advocates of criminalization, these 
features allow for abuse of arbitral powers.  These advocates believe 
arbitrators have an incentive to render an unfair award if they will benefit 
from bribes or other personal benefits.173  Arbitrators can earn hundreds of 
                                                      
163  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88. 
164  Luo Guoqiang, supra note72, at 64. 
165  See Chen Wei, supra note 163, at 58-59. 
166  A judge assumes criminal responsibility in that situation.  See The Amendment, supra note 28, at 
art. 20. 
167  See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1757. 
168  See Xia Siyang et al., Wangfa Zhongcai Gaibugai Shou Xingfa Tiaozheng (枉法仲裁该不该受刑法调
整 ) [Is the Crime Arbitration by Perversion of Law Appropriate] JIANCHA RIBAO ( 检 察 日 报 ) 
[PROCURATORIAL DAILY], Jan. 23, 2006, at A6. 
169  Yang Mi, LunZhongguo ChuantongWenhuade Tezhi Dui Zhonghua Faxide Yingxiang (论中国传统
文化的特质对中华法系的影响) [The Impact of the Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Culture on Chinese 
Legal System], 33 HARBIN XUEYUAN XUEBAO (哈尔滨学院学报) [J. HARBIN U.] 58, 60 (2012). 
170  LIU XIAOHONG ET AL.,GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI ZHUANTI YANJIU (国际商事仲裁专题研究) [A 
MONOGRAPHIC STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW ] 432 (2009). 
171  See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854).  See also Springs Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 
275 A.D. 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949); American Almond Products Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944); Dampskibsselsk Dannebrog v. Strange & Co., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 
1932). 
172  ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 18. 
173  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88.162 
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thousands to sometimes over a million dollars from a single arbitration.174  
In the case of bribery, partiality in arbitration could result in actual injury to 
the complaining party and social justice would then be greatly harmed.175  
By promulgating the Amendment, the law establishes what might be a 
credible penalty regime imposed on a biased arbitrator, even though the 
cases of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” are relatively rare.176   The 
advocates argue that “no crime without law; no penalty without law” is one 
of the generally accepted principles of criminal law in most jurisdictions.177 
Another powerful pro-criminalization argument is that arbitration is 
quasi-judicial in nature and thus should be held to similar standards as the 
judiciary. 178   The advocates for criminalization realize the fact that 
arbitration resembles litigation and remains intimately dependent on a 
national legal system.179  Arbitrators are expected to act like judges who will 
do justice to all parties and guarantee them a fair hearing and a just award.180  
More importantly, there is an expectation that arbitral awards, like 
judgments, are to be enforced by national courts.181  Thus, for the pro-crime 
advocates, arbitration cannot be viewed merely as a contract of legal 
services, but the power to make a judicial decision, which falls within the 
authority of the judicature.182  Respecting parties’ intent to arbitrate under 
the doctrine of party autonomy does not imply a respect for an arbitrator’s 
freedom to disregard the law.183  While an arbitrator is a private judge, to be 
a judge means to be empowered to make a decision in accordance with the 
law instead of going against it.184   
For the advocates for criminalization, the qualification of arbitrators is 
also a key factor in introducing the criminal statute.  They argue that 
building a highly qualified team of arbitrators is extremely difficult, given 
that China’s market economy has not had much time to develop.185  Unlike 
                                                      
174  John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in International Commercial 
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1–3 (1999). 
175  See Wang Jianbo, Xingfa Xiuzhengan Liu Diershitiao Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Lijie Yu Shiyong   
(刑法修正案（六）第二十条枉法仲裁罪的理解与适用) [Understanding the Application of Article XX. 
of the Amendments to the Criminal Law (VI): Distortion of Arbitration Law] 1 GUANGZHOUSHI GONGAN 
GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO (广州市公安管理干部学院学报) [J.GUANGZHOU POLICE ADMIN.C.] 
47, 47 (2007). 
176  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88.  
177  See Luo Guoqiang, supra note 72, at 65. 
178  Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88. 
179  Id. at 86. 
180  See Chen Wei, supra note 162, at 58. 
181  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 86. 
182  See Liu Xiaohong, supra note 70, at 86. 
183  See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 86. 
184  Liu Xiaohong, supra note 70, at 86. 
185  See Luo Guoqiang, supra note 72, at 71. 
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judges, arbitrators are not required to obtain any legal training or pass any 
professional examinations before performing their duties. 186   Lacking 
training, it is more likely for them to intentionally go against the law and 
make a wrongful ruling for the sake of money than judges.187  After all, the 
fee amount is often determined by, or at least influenced by, the arbitrators 
themselves.188  Arbitral awards are sometimes rendered in favor of the party 
with guanxi.189  It is certain the situation would be much worse if there were 
no such a strict law regarding the impartiality of arbitrators.190 
Since the lack of workability issue can be addressed by promulgating 
further detailed rules, the advocates for criminalization argue that it should 
not be used as a justification to deny the validity of the criminal provision.191  
For the pro-crime advocates, while the provision is far from developed, 
especially with respect to its workability, it seems unreasonable to reject the 
criminal statute based solely on this shortcoming.192  After all, most crimes 
in Chinese criminal law are virtually non-enforceable without further 
detailed rules.193  Even with a measure of skepticism, it is reasonable to 
make an exception and argue that the provision will deter the corrupted 
arbitrators in arbitration.194  Having established the validity of the criminal 
statute, the court can proceed to articulate a judicial standard for imposing 
liability on arbitrators who violate the statute.  This change is a necessary 
step to address the appearance of partiality and will ensure the enactment is 
one that contributes to China’s arbitration framework.195  
The advocates for criminalization also argue that the criminal 
provision is appropriate given the present stage of economic development in 
China.196  Due to the underdevelopment of market economies and the short 
history of arbitration, absolute party autonomy in some Asian countries and 
districts—such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—appears not to work 
well because of a lack of enforcement, making it necessary to govern 
arbitration with strict laws. 197   In addition, while such laws have been 
                                                      
186  Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88. 
187  See id. 
188  See Gotanda, supra note 174. 
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supra note 5, at 781. 
190  See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1758. 
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194  See Chen Wei, supra note 162, at 59. 
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196  See id. 
197  See id. at 70. 
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attacked for being contrary to international practice, some contend that 
arbitration would benefit from the imposition of more severe punishments to 
decrease the possibility of arbitral misuse.198  It would ensure the healthy 
development of arbitration and make China an attractive place for 
international arbitration.199  A more well-developed arbitration system in 
those regions appears to be achieved through the support of public power.200  
Those countries do not have to wait hundreds of years to naturally raise the 
professional quality arbitrators, establish a code of arbitrator ethics, and 
cultivate social trust in arbitration.201  Moreover, given social and cultural 
differences, it would be inadequate for China to follow the same route of 
regulating arbitrator conduct as the West.  The development of arbitration 
can be promoted by means of legislation, making full use of the advantages 
from both the common law and continental law systems.202  
3.  Conclusions Based on Both Sides of the Debate 
As previously shown, the criminal liability of biased arbitrators has 
been widely debated.  The arguments against criminalization criticize the 
provision for its failure to conform to either the nature of arbitration or the 
international trend of minimal judicial intervention.203  In addition, critics 
regard the poor wording and lack of guidance in the statute as fatal flaws.   
Conversely, the strength of the arguments for criminalization has come 
to be recognized by legislators.204   A powerful argument is the analogy 
drawn between the social harm of judicial corruption and that of arbitrator 
misconduct.  If a judge who acts with bias and perverts the law assumes 
criminal responsibility, why should a “private judge” be immune from 
similar punishment?  Arbitrators are no less susceptible to corruption than 
professional judicial personnel.205  At the very least, the criminal provision 
appears to embody the principle that like situations must be treated alike.206  
Proponents of the provision argue that the justice of arbitration and 
protection of the rights and interests of parties can be achieved in practice 
through the regulation of arbitration with state interference, whereas its 
opponents are against public intervention and believe that the previous goals 
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can only be realized through the development of arbitration itself.  The 
possibility of criminal conviction would presumably deter biased arbitrators.  
While such deterrence is a net social good, there is another risk:  abuse of 
the statute by prosecutors.  The prosecutor, by threatening to bring a criminal 
prosecution unless the arbitrator rules a certain way, could undermine the 
independence of the arbitration process.  The debate over the criminal statute 
remains largely inconclusive and, as such, will continue into the foreseeable 
future, as will empirical studies seeking to resolve the debate.   
Admittedly, the arguments for criminalization are not without 
criticism.  It is universally acknowledged that arbitration is different from 
litigation:  the former has historically been a dispute resolution mechanism 
for transactions that implicate only private law. 207   Thus, the power of 
arbitrators should not be deemed the same as that of judges.  But apart from 
this, the lack of workability is a good argument that invites serious 
consideration.  Of greatest concern is the conflict between China’s domestic 
law and its international obligations.  Unfortunately, in practice, the 
provision is not likely to serve its purported function because the problem of 
workability cannot be addressed by the provision itself.208  Thus, it urgently 
needs to be restructured.  To address these problems, it is beneficial to 
compare China’s arbitration system with other international arbitral 
institutions.  
C.  Situating the Chinese Debate with the U.S. Experience Regarding the 
Impartiality of Arbitrators 
In sharp contrast to the current Chinese approach, which has minimal 
provisions concerning arbitrator neutrality, but a sharply punitive criminal 
statute if there is bias by “perversion of law,” the U.S. approach has been 
quite different.  As early as 1632, Massachusetts became the first colony to 
adopt laws supporting arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.209   
The analysis of arbitral impartiality in the United States relies on an 
analogy to judicial impartiality.210  Arbitrators are viewed in the same light 
                                                      
207  See Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates Enforcement of Regulatory 
Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: From the Bremen's License to the Sky Reefer's Edict, 
30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 63 (1997). 
208  See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36. 
209  In 1925, the federal government enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  The statute 
recognized the benefits of arbitration and established a national policy favoring arbitration.  See Steven A. 
Certilman, This Is a Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3 NEW YORK DISP. RES. LAW. 10, 10–
12 (2010). 
210  See Claudia T. Salomon et al., Arbitrator’s Disclosure Standards: the Uncertainty Continues, 63 
OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 76, 82 (2008). 
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as judges and therefore must be held to the same standards of impartiality as 
are imposed on judges.211   As a judge is immune to civil and criminal 
liability for his wrong rulings,212 an arbitrator does not have to assume any 
legal responsibility for a wrong arbitral award either.213  The usual remedies 
for an arbitrator’s unfairness include removal of the arbitrator and vacatur of 
the award. 214   The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that an 
arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there was evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 215   To show “evident 
partiality” by an arbitrator under the FAA, a party either must establish 
specific facts indicating actual bias toward or against a party, or show that 
the arbitrator failed to disclose to the parties information that creates a 
reasonable impression of bias.216  The Supreme Court held “this rule of 
arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics rest on the premise that any 
tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be 
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”217  Nevertheless, 
the Seventh Circuit found “arbitration differs from adjudication, among 
many other ways, because the ‘appearance of partiality’ grounds for 
disqualification of judges does not apply to arbitrators; only evident 
partiality, not appearances or risks, spoils an award.”218 
U.S. appellate courts have established four factors to determine if a 
claimant has demonstrated evident partiality:  1) any personal interest, 
pecuniary or otherwise, the arbitrator has in the proceeding; 2) the directness 
of the relationship between the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor; 
3) the connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and 4) the proximity 
in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.219  When 
considering each factor, the court should determine whether the asserted bias 
is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, rather than remote, 
uncertain, or speculative, and whether the facts are sufficient to indicate the 
arbitrator’s improper motives.220  The Supreme Court expressed disfavor 
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with any notion that the slightest pecuniary interest would constitute evident 
partiality.221 
As discussed above, many arbitral tribunals have a three-arbitrator 
panel. 222   Under the common arrangement, each party designates one 
arbitrator (party arbitrators or non-neutral arbitrators) and the parties 
collectively select a third (neutral arbitrator).  Party arbitrators are not 
expected to be as impartial as neutral arbitrators.223  “Evident partiality” is a 
ground for vacatur only for neutral arbitrators because non-neutral 
arbitrators, unless otherwise agreed, serve as representatives of the parties 
appointing them.224  In other words, absent overt corruption or misconduct in 
the arbitration itself, no arbitrator appointed by a party may be challenged on 
the ground of his relationship to that party.225  Furthermore, a party with 
constructive knowledge of the potential partiality of an arbitrator may waive 
its right to challenge an arbitration award based on evident partiality if it 
fails to object to the arbitrator’s appointment or the arbitrator’s failure to 
make disclosures until after an award is issued.226 
Vacatur of an arbitration award is appropriate under the FAA only in 
exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as when arbitrators are partial or 
corrupt, or when an arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather than 
merely erroneously interprets, the law.227  An arbitration award can only be 
vacated on one of four exclusive statutory grounds:  1) corruption, fraud, or 
misconduct in procuring the award; 2) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as 
a neutral arbitrator; 3) an overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or 
such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made; 4) a failure to follow the procedure 
of the Arbitration Code unless the party applying to vacate the award 
continued with the arbitration with notice of the failure and without 
objection; or 5) the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.228  
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A financial interest in the outcome of the arbitration or a direct 
relationship with a party are relevant considerations when determining 
whether an arbitrator's relationship is material to the arbitration at issue, for 
purposes of determining whether failure to disclose a conflict of interest 
warrants vacatur of an award under the FAA. 229   An arbitrator has the 
obligation to disclose to the parties any interest or bias, and failing to do so 
might constitute “evident partiality,” 230  though no specific provision 
pertaining to disclosure has been established in U.S. law.231  In addition, 
peculiar industry practices and norms are considered in determining whether 
an arbitration award is subject to vacatur, particularly with an arbitrator’s 
full and timely disclosures regarding business relationships with the 
parties.232  Under the evident partiality standard, arbitrators are held to a less 
strict disclosure regime than the appearance of partiality standard that 
applies to judges.233  According to the revised Uniform Arbitration Act, an 
arbitrator has a continuing duty to disclose any fact he learns after his 
appointment if a reasonable person would consider it likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator.234   
The arbitrator has a duty to disqualify him or herself upon discovery 
of sufficient reasons for such action, in order to avoid prejudicing an 
effective arbitration.235  This self-disqualification of the arbitrator is required 
under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which 
require any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator to disclose 
to the AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial 
or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present 
relationships with the parties or their representatives.236 
In principle, arbitrators are not required to explain an arbitration 
award and their silence cannot be used to infer grounds for vacating an 
award.237  A party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on grounds of 
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evident partiality has the burden of proof; to meet this burden, the party must 
demonstrate that a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator was 
partial to the other party to the arbitration.238  Specifically, the party that 
alleges that an arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other 
undue means must:  1) establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence; 
2) demonstrate that the fraud was not discoverable by the exercise of due 
diligence before or during the arbitration hearing; and 3) demonstrate that 
the fraud was materially related to an issue in the arbitration.239  Generally, a 
controversy of merits between parties to arbitration cannot be challenged as 
an allegation of evident partiality or corruption by the losing party.240  It is 
largely for this reason that the merits of an award are not subject to judicial 
review.241  Courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning, 
and may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s 
award.242  Thus, the general rule is that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be 
reviewed for errors of fact or law.243  In addition, “California’s legislature 
has reduced the risk to the parties . . . by providing for judicial review only 
in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with 
the fairness of the arbitration process.”244  Arbitration awards have a longer 
history of publication in the West than in China, which makes it more 
difficult to hide or disguise a distortion of law.245   
The U.S. approach works for a well-developed legal system with a 
strong rule of law model, but it is less clear that it would work well for 
China’s arbitration system.  To fully understand why the Chinese approach 
using a criminal provision is a rational choice, it is important to place the 
arbitration process in the context of the history of the Chinese legal system. 
D. Stepping Back:  Exploring the “Perversion of Law” Provision in Light 
of the Historical Development of Chinese Legal System 
In order to fully comprehend the criminal provision of arbitrator 
responsibility, it is necessary to obtain some perspectives on the historical 
development of the Chinese legal system as a whole as it functions in 
practice.  The current Chinese legal system is still heavily burdened or 
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influenced by traditional forces.246  For example, corruption has been long 
regarded as one of the most serious crimes in China.247  Penal punishment, 
including the death penalty, has been applied to state officials found guilty 
of accepting bribes.248   
Without a fundamental knowledge of the Chinese legal tradition, a 
plain reading of the provision might lead readers to make a misguided 
attempt to apply their own ethnocentric experiences to a quite distinct legal 
system.  Analyzing some cultural and traditional elements influencing the 
criminal provision demonstrates some probable reasons for the statute from 
a historical perspective.  The analysis suggests that a criminal law-oriented 
legal culture, a civil law tradition, and an underdevelopment of market 
economy in China contribute to the penal liability of arbitrators.  
1.  Chinese Legal Culture 
Law operates in a cultural context and is impacted by the culture 
around it, yet that culture is in turn affected by the operation of law.249  
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” became a criminal provision due to 
various social and cultural elements.  Chinese legal culture, which differs 
greatly from those of Western countries, is at the heart of the issue.  The 
dominance of Confucian thinking influenced Chinese attitudes toward 
law.250  The basic philosophy underlying ancient Chinese law is a belief in 
harmony, which leads officials to deal with legal cases in terms of a 
“situation to be restored” rather than in terms of “individuals seeking 
justice.”251  Any recourse by citizens to legal process was regarded as a 
disturbance of harmony and a shame not only for both parties, but also for 
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their families, relatives, and clans.252  Traditionally, the preferred means for 
settling most civil disputes is to resort to informal mediation rather than to 
bring their disputes to court, which reflects the attitude among many Chinese 
of avoiding litigation as much as possible.253 
In accordance with this theory, two prominent characteristics in 
China’s ancient legal system have to be mentioned.  One is that the law was 
only a tool of government policy and all legislation was criminal law, named 
Xing.254  Xing, similar in meaning to Bing (war) in old Chinese, originated 
from the state policy of violence, and both Xing and Bing constitute two 
sides of the coin.255  Xing concerns an internal policy of violence; Bing 
represents a foreign policy.256  The law was equated with violence, and there 
was no bifurcation between criminal and civil law.257  The state took little 
interest in large areas of society, notably contract and commercial law:  
sales, loans, and banking. 258   These areas could be regulated and were 
regulated if any state interest became involved.259  Thus, in the eyes of an 
average Chinese citizen, law for a long period of time  meant one thing:  
punishment. 260   Historically, the Emperor was concerned primarily with 
maintaining order; his attention, and the attention of local bureaucrats, was 
only incidentally drawn to what would be called civil matters today.261 
The other prominent characteristic of the Chinese legal system is that 
the law was actually regarded as an accessory to moral education, and claims 
of morality were always held superior to those of law.262  For instance, 
natural harmony would best be preserved if men behaved in accordance with 
Li (the teaching of morality), which recognized the inequality of persons on 
account of social status, age, gender and local kinship ties.263  Li, used in 
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conjunction with Xing, included a set of moral standards of conduct in 
different situations appropriate for persons with high social status.264  These 
standards shaped the attitudes that were considered to be morally correct and 
were regarded as the ideal for relationships in society.265  If ordinary people 
could be taught Li by precept, example, and symbolic ritual, there would 
have been no need for anything like Xing.  But for those refractory persons 
who failed to make their behavior conform to Li, punishments had to be 
prescribed in the form of penal law.266  Therefore, the distinction between 
law and morality was sometimes indeterminate in practice.267 
There was no category of public law and private law in early Chinese 
codification. 268  Most of these codes focused on punishment for 
administrative breaches of bureaucratic procedure or for conduct considered 
disruptive to social order.269  These laws were all public by nature even 
though they were commonly applied in private fields.270  Despite being penal 
in form, the provisions of the codes covered all private matters.  For 
instance, the codes covered loan conflicts, marriage, and succession, which 
are classified as civil law under Western jurisprudence.271  In fact, there were 
few commercial disputes in ancient China which were solved by laws.272 
The criminal law and morality-oriented tradition was the mainspring 
of China’s ancient legal system and method of law enforcement.273  Of the 
two, the criminal law is probably the more important element, as “law” and 
criminal law have generally been considered equivalent in the historical 
context of China.274  The criminal law tradition also embodied the need for 
state rule at that time, which resulted in centralization of state power.275  The 
traditional pattern of Chinese government was authoritarian and 
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bureaucratic. 276   There was no concept of “checks and balances” or 
“separation of powers.”277  Even courts have always been a functional arm 
of the Chinese bureaucracy.278  For example, in imperial China the central 
government appointed local officials.279  They exercised a wide range of 
functions, being generally accountable for the good order and prosperity of 
their districts, for the collection of local taxes and supply of corvée labor, 
and concurrently discharging judicial duties when occasion arose.280  When 
the concentration of power in a society enlarges, inevitably the criminal 
legal system becomes more developed.281 
When the notion of centralization of state power is so dominant that 
the state and collective interests surpass those of individuals, any 
infringement of private rights could be interpreted and deemed as damaging 
to social order and state interests.282  The state and the people will clearly 
express their attitude towards wrongdoers in the form of revenge and 
punishment.283  The scope of public matters was therefore greatly expanded 
and it is unsurprising that all laws in ancient Chinese society were criminal 
laws, or at least laws with criminal elements.284  This attitude better explains 
why the partiality of arbitrators becomes a social concern and criminal 
punishment—instead of breach of contract or damages—is eventually 
considered as a remedy to address the problem.285 
At the dawn of the 20th century, a legal reform by the Qing Dynasty, 
the last imperial dynasty, aimed to imitate Western legal systems.286  It was 
generally recognized that if China was to play a significant part in world 
affairs, the Chinese would have to bring their law in line with the modern 
systems of the West.287  The most distinguishing substantive change was the 
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separation of civil laws from criminal laws. 288   However, the whole 
development of modern law in China was hampered by the inability of the 
regime to create a satisfactory pattern of supporting institutions.289  At the 
very least, the principle of law reform was accepted, but much still needed to 
be done.290   
To date, the ancient Chinese legal tradition continues to impact the 
legal process in at least two aspects.  First, lawmakers are inclined to employ 
criminal laws to maintain stability in large areas of social life.291   This 
feature, a distinctive Chinese characteristic, is still strong and might remain 
so in the foreseeable future.292  Meanwhile, criminal provisions often contain 
moral statements.293  Second, due to lack of a tradition of private rule of law, 
average people have less trust in private rights and are more accustomed to 
turning to state power for their sense of security.294  Because of the long 
history of Confucianism influence of moral teaching, local officials were not 
only government officials and judges appointed by the central government, 
but were also ideally expected to be models and educators on a moral level, 
and were called “father-and-mother officials.”295  That understanding is also 
why corruption became a felony where the officials’ rule was not as good as 
their name suggested.296  
Law is a passive instrument whose operation can be either promoted 
or impeded by culture.  The distinction between Eastern and Western legal 
cultures seems much more pronounced than the distinctions among different 
Western legal cultures.297  It is difficult to compare different legal cultures 
that originated from different legal traditions.  Taking those diametrically 
opposed traditions into account, the Chinese arbitration system is within the 
larger framework of China’s national legal system and it evolves with that 
national system.  With no Western rule of law tradition on one side, and a 
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strong influence from local criminal law-favored and morality-oriented 
tradition on the other, it appears that penal responsibility of arbitrators is not 
only the best choice in the eyes of Chinese authorities, but also desirable for 
the vast majority of people.298  This is not surprising given the ambivalent 
value of criminal law for modern China. 
2. Civil Law Tradition 
It was only a century ago that China started systematically codifying 
civil laws.299  Following the Legal Reform of Qing Dynasty, for the first 
time a division between civil and criminal law was substituted for the 
traditional classification according to administrative departments.300  From 
1929 to 1931, a civil code was introduced, based on the legal codes of 
Germany and Japan, which now has a direct offspring in Taiwan.301  Legal 
ideas were directly copied from one legal system to the other.302  Legislators 
were content with formalism and law-making.303  For these reasons, it is 
often believed that the current Chinese legal system can be classified as part 
of the civil law family. 304   The influence of civil law in the criminal 
provision is apparent because, in general, civil law systems favor codified 
legislation as opposed to judge-made rules, and in common law systems it is 
difficult to hold judges liable for misuse of the law. 
One of the enduring differences between the common and civil law 
systems is with respect to what is actual law.305  If the law is only defined as 
statutes, then “law” in China means something much different than it does in 
the United States.  In common law countries, case law is commonly believed 
to be the main source of the law, whereas in civil law countries, the law is 
primarily based on statutes.306  The latter jurisdictions have put emphasis on 
legislation, and people find themselves with more interests in statute-making 
than dispute resolution. 307   Civil law judges are thus described as 
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“mechanically appl[ying] legislative provisions to given fact situations.”308  
This feature embodies the deductive method of the civil law system, which 
is distinct from the inductive one of common law.309  
China introduced the deductive method into its domestic legal 
system.310  In civil law countries, a dichotomy often exists between “paper 
law,” or the law in published regulations, and a law in action.311   This 
dichotomy seems more exaggerated in China than in other countries.312  As 
arbitration is a significant part of the justice system on which Chinese 
society relies, it is not surprising that the legislature believes that it is in the 
public interest to establish a generally accepted enactment to regulate 
arbitration.313  If punishments are to act as deterrents, it is important to have 
them systematized and published so that arbitrators know the consequences 
of wrong-doing.  It is unclear to what extent the criminal provision of 
arbitrator responsibility reflects the status quo in China. However, much of 
China’s formal law does not generally reflect practice and has not been 
developed with an eye to existing social realities.314  This difference results 
in certain regulated areas being unregulated in practice.315  The Chinese 
overconfidence in the power of legislation helps explain the provision 
regardless of the significant gap between the law de facto and the law de 
jure.  Although officially enacted, the provision does not yet represent actual 
practice in China, and can hardly be expected to function well, especially 
when the provision is so abstract that it has little workability as a “living” 
law.316  
Another noteworthy aspect is the influence of the judge in different 
legal systems.  Civil law adjudicators should mechanically follow the law 
(statutes), rather than “create” the law.317  Parties go to court only to resolve 
disputes in the civil law system where statutory law, and in particular the 
civil codes, are not interpreted, but are rather simply applied by judges to 
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determine the outcome of cases. 318   While civil law judges have broad 
managerial powers, they are expected to apply the law in an almost 
mechanical way, remaining controlled instruments of the legislature.319  In 
fact, there is no room for judges’ participation in the creation or 
transformation of legal rules.320  Conversely, it is readily acknowledged that 
in the United States, parties seek to achieve changes in the law and judges 
make law.321  The task of a common law judge is to evaluate counsels’ 
competing arguments about hyper-factual analogies and subtle distinctions 
in prior decisional law. 322   They have express law-making and policy-
creating functions.323   In addition, many civil law judges consider it an 
important part of their job to help the parties reach an amicable settlement.324  
In the amicable settlement, civil law judges play a positive role and 
sometimes have to “disregard” the law.  Thus, they are more likely to “twist 
the law.”  However, judges in the common law system are comparatively 
passive in their fact-finding role.  Notably, civil law judges have more 
chances to engage in “perversion of law.”  Without doubt, their impartiality 
duties need not be, and cannot be, the same as those of common law 
judges.325  A common law judge is not accountable for his decision, even if 
unfair, or for any loss the parties may thereby incur.326  Nor is an arbitrator, 
who is deemed to be a quasi-judge.327  Decisions that deviate from the law 
would not be considered an inappropriate violation of impartiality 
obligations in the common law system.328  Since a U.S. judge has the power 
to make law, he could hardly be charged with “disregard of law.”  Crimes 
like adjudicators’ “perversion of law” appear only to be found in Asian 
countries with a civil law tradition.329  These countries lack experiences in 
arbitration, which leads to the misleading judicial referent that arbitrators 
and judges are both subsets of adjudicators and they should abide strictly by 
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the statutes in a similar way. 330   The orientation of Arbitration by 
“Perversion of Law” offences have, to some extent, been deeply rooted in  
this tradition. 
3.  The Underdevelopment of China’s Market Economy  
The traditional Chinese society differed sharply from the 
contemporary Western one in that the former was an agricultural countryside 
society whereas the latter was a society based on market economies.331  
Agriculture was viewed as the natural form of economy in ancient China.332  
Beginning early in the imperial dynastic period, the state adopted a policy of 
encouraging agriculture and restraining commerce. 333   The prevailing 
attitude was that war and agriculture were the only occupations fit for the 
people. 334   The law did little to protect merchants. 335   On the contrary, 
sanctions were placed on those who chose to engage in commercial activities 
rather than agricultural work.336  The Chinese rulers even issued decrees 
criminalizing trade.337  These events led an entire nation to lose interest in 
commerce.338  Furthermore, Chinese leaders wished to control the beliefs 
and ideas of the populace in order to preserve sociopolitical stability.339  
With fewer market transactions, there would be less movement among the 
Chinese population and lowered risk of the exchange and dominance of 
ideas such as equality, freedom, and democracy.340 
Unlike a market economy, which is a society of strangers, the 
agricultural society of ancient China was a society of acquaintances.341  In 
this society, traditional moral education played a more important role than 
law. 342   Confucian thought, emphasizing harmony and inequality among 
people of different social statuses, had a meaningful influence on 
government and individual behavior. 343   There was a strong sense of 
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extended family and continuity between father and son, ancestors and self, 
and the dead and the living.344  Moreover, in a much simpler and closer 
society, it is easier to enforce complete subordination of the individual to the 
state, exalt the absolute authority of the ruler, and regiment all citizens by 
the merciless enforcement of a brutal code of law and punishment.345 
As shown in history, China suffered greatly from the suppression of 
the market economy.346  Although Chinese civilization dominated the world 
for many hundreds of years, it ultimately fell far behind during the Ming 
dynasty (1368 to 1644).347  Chinese people  began to engage in significant 
foreign trade during the mid-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 348  
Astonishingly, no laws pertaining to trade developed during this time, and 
foreign trade did not create enthusiasm in commerce.349  As trade increased, 
foreign businesses and their governments came to exert increasing influence 
over Chinese affairs.350  China lost many aspects of its sovereignty to foreign 
powers after a series of wars.351  The comprehensive attempts to create a 
formal legal system governing commerce began only in 1979.352  In the last 
four decades, a large body of laws and regulations has been enacted with the 
aim of creating rules that would support an economy based on market 
incentives, while retaining the basic principles of socialism.353  Despite the 
movement toward market economics, real change was a gradual process and 
the Chinese economy remains, to some extent, under state control.354  Since 
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an economy based even partly on market principles requires significant 
decentralization of economic decision-making, there are conflicts with the 
centralized state power in Chinese legal culture.  One must keep in mind that 
China is a country without a tradition of governance by law.355 
Arbitration is widely believed to be an inherently private system of 
dispute resolution and a product of a market economy.356  This perception is 
supported to some extent by the history of arbitration and the degree of 
parties’ control in shaping arbitration proceedings. 357   However, the 
development of arbitration in China has not followed the same track of 
market economy as that in the West.358  China’s commercial environment is 
significantly different.359  Chinese arbitration lacks the purported popularity, 
custom, and ability of private governance that American arbitration provides, 
due to the incomplete development of the market economy.360  While China 
is transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy, the latter is extremely young, having just been formally proposed 
in the 1990s.361  There were few arbitrators with comprehensive knowledge 
of, and experience in, trade, maritime, economics, and law. 362   The 
immaturity of the market economy and the socialist central planning-
featured tradition thus provide arbitration with less soil for growth. 
It is important to note that the development of arbitration in China is 
not due to the maturity of its market economy or the principle of party 
autonomy, but as a result of government promotion.363  Although arbitration 
commissions are proclaimed to be administratively independent from both 
the local and national governmental units in accordance with Arbitration 
Law,364 in fact they are far from truly independent.365  Most of them are in 
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some respects linked to various administrative authorities in that their 
existence depends on the manner and degree to which they are supported by 
the local Chinese governments.366  It is unsurprising that arbitrators are thus 
easily viewed as government officials, and the standard of arbitrator 
impartiality is naturally expected to be the same as that of judges. 367  
Furthermore, there is no Chinese code of ethics for arbitrators.368  Therefore, 
regulation of arbitrators can hardly be realized through a common practice, 
market rules of competition, or reputation.  On the contrary, regulation must 
be dependent upon state power and a criminal provision.   
IV. EVALUATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL STATUTE AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM 
China’s arbitrator liability system diverges in some respects from both 
civil law and common law in order to accommodate its peculiar cultural 
context.  One rather unexpected move by the Chinese legislature was that 
they imposed criminal liability on biased arbitrators, which is rarely found in 
the rest of the world. 369   Arbitration can be efficient, inexpensive, and 
harmonious.370  As wide discretion is left to the parties, their attorneys, and 
the arbitrators to fashion the procedure as they wish without any judicial 
interference,371 it is possible for arbitrators to “betray” the trust of the parties 
and rule against the provision of the law. 372   However, the Chinese 
legislative attitude toward arbitration, demonstrated by the criminal statute, 
seems to be unfriendly to arbitrators and discourages deference to 
arbitration.  To prevent the misconduct of a biased arbitrator, holding him 
criminally responsible appears to be the best alternative due to the emphasis 
on criminal law in the Chinese legal culture.  Analyzing the criminal 
provision demonstrates that “when arbitrators step into judges’ shoes, they 
seem to be wearing them on the wrong feet.”373  However, there are some 
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additional ways to help reform the criminal liability provision.  Since the 
provision is abstract, there is much room relating to how to apply it.  Some 
possible solutions such as private prosecution, criminal liability for the 
neutral arbitrator, civil liability, and a detailed definition of the criminal 
provision have also been proposed with the purpose of removing the 
workability limitations of the provision and making it function well.  This 
part explores A) evaluations of the criminal provision and B) reform 
proposals. 
A.  Evaluations on the Criminal Provision 
With the enactment, the task of ensuring arbitrator neutrality in China 
presents a number of possible barriers, both in perception and reality.  While 
the criminal provision has been articulated, its purported effect is 
questionable because, as previously discussed, the ambiguity of its 
provisions make enforcement uncertain.  On the other hand, the ambiguity of 
the provision will undoubtedly hinder arbitrators’ power to evaluate the 
evidence at their discretion as well as provide People’s Courts and People’s 
Procuratorates the opportunity to abuse their power.  A misapplication of the 
ambiguous provision will infringe on the legal rights and interests of the 
arbitrator and the parties.  The Chinese legislature made an inaccurate 
analogy concerning arbitrators and judges when enacting the law without 
carefully examining the harsh consequences of a criminal penalty.374  This 
results in the power of judicial review with arbitration expanded and the 
review cost increased.  In turn, it seemingly would have had some 
negative impact on the arbitrator market and the development of arbitration 
in China. 
1.  Inapt Analogy Between the Role of Arbitrators and Judges 
The Chinese legislature made an inapt analogy between the role of 
arbitrators and that of judges, in which the former are considered virtually 
identical to the latter.  After all, arbitrators are not officials, as  judges are.375  
Therefore, some scholars have claimed that if it was necessary to create a 
criminal provision dealing with arbitrator misconduct, it would be better 
phrased as fraud or infringement upon property, on the basis of contract, 
rather than a crime of dereliction of duty.376 
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To ensure impartiality, it is imperative for China to regulate the biased 
arbitrators.  The law makers, however, address the concern with a more 
severe means than may be necessary—criminal liability.  A position that all 
adjudicators should be neutral and arbitrators should behave as impartially 
as judges confuses the distinction between arbitration and litigation. 
“Despite the resemblance between arbitration proceedings and court 
proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that the former is the result of a 
private contract while the latter arises from the state’s authority to resolve 
disputes and to compel compliance.” 377   Arbitrators, as private actors, 
“perform their function for private gain.” 378   Consequently, blindly 
transplanting the criminal provision of Judicial Personnel of “Perversion of 
Law” and applying it to arbitrators is an ineffective method to achieve the 
desired social goals of impartiality and justice.379 
2.  High Cost to Dispute Resolution 
The criminal provisions give the People’s Procuratorates power to 
intervene in arbitration.  An increase in incidents of intervention carries the 
risk of an associated increase incost of arbitration.  
The crimes of dereliction of duty, which the state personnel who 
exercise state power may commit under the current Chinese law, involve a 
public prosecution case.380  As Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” has been 
provided under the category of crimes of dereliction of duty, the suit should 
be filed by the People’s Procuratorates instead of the complainant. 381  
Therefore, the People’s Procuratorates have been granted the power to 
review the findings of facts and application of laws in arbitration in order to 
prove the crime before the court.  Further, in order to determine whether a 
“biased” arbitrator has gone “against facts and laws” and render a ruling, the 
People’s Courts have to examine and investigate the substantial parts of an 
arbitral award again, 382  which is equivalent to a retrial.  That inquiry, 
however, challenges the finality of arbitration.  Thus, the courts’ power has 
been greatly expanded.  For many disputants, although the resolution is 
ostensibly by wayof arbitration, it is the court’s ruling that ultimately 
resolves the case.383  Arbitration itself serves no important purpose.  The cost 
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of dispute resolution has been increased because the statute seems to impose 
an additional level of litigation.  The offence appears to be moving farther 
away from the principle of deference to arbitral rulings. 
3.  Prelude to Abyss of Conflicts 
The criminal provision conflicts with China’s international obligations 
and lacks detailed rules.  The legislature has put itself and the judicial 
authority into a dilemma, in that the review of the merits of arbitration does 
not conform to China’s international convention obligations, whereas 
omission of criminal liability is against China’s criminal statute. 384   If 
international commercial arbitration is not subject to substantive scrutiny in 
China, then it fails to provide sufficient supervision as the criminal law 
requires.385  The likely outcome is that only domestic commercial arbitrators, 
not international arbitrators, will be convicted. 386   Such discrimination 
towards domestic arbitrators would damage the integrity of China’s criminal 
justice system.  But to guarantee equal prosecution, the People’s 
Procuratorates would have to review the merits and reasoning of 
international arbitration proceedings, which constitutes a violation of the 
New York Convention.387  Furthermore, a foreign law is commonly applied 
in international commercial arbitration.388  It is not appropriate for a Chinese 
court to make a decision concerning the interpretation of a foreign law, 
which may constitute an infringement of foreign sovereignty in violation of 
the basic principle of international law, since the foreign law is enacted and 
should only be interpreted by the foreign authority. 389   Moreover, the 
determination of foreign law is another problem on account of the 
complexities of different languages, inaccurate understanding of the laws, 
and varying legislative intent. 390   Therefore, Chinese judicial organs’ 
inherited way of thinking in terms of domestic law might bring about real 
“Verdict by Perversion of Law.”   
Without detailed rules, the crime of Arbitration by “Perversion of 
Law” is of little practical value.  Besides what has been mentioned earlier,391 
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the provision has not been defined well enough and there is still much 
ambiguity.392  Sometimes an arbitral award is rendered through mediation,393 
which is not required to be in accordance with law.394  In such a case, it is 
very difficult to determine whether there is “arbitrator running counter to the 
law.”395  In addition, an arbitrator is criminally liable only when his or her 
conduct is intentional, but the law is silent on the arbitrator’s liability for 
negligence resulting from a lack of professional care and due diligence.396  
More importantly, it provides no clue to distinguish an intentional act from a 
negligent behavior. 397   Another unreasonable situation could occur if a 
foreign arbitral award  made by a Chinese arbitrator is recognized and 
enforced by a Chinese court, but another Chinese court finds the arbitrator 
guilty of “Perversion of Law.” 398 
4.  The Harsh Consequences of Criminal Liability 
Excessive or inappropriate criminal penalties may prevent productive 
conduct and should be minimized.399  The criminal penalty can result in 
harsh consequences to the individual, his or her family, and indirectly to 
society as a whole.400  A state should avoid misusing a criminal penalty and 
instead tailor a penalty that avoids excessive, ineffective, or costly penalties.  
In a modern society, with the focus moving towards citizens’ rights and 
interests, civil laws play a more important role than criminal laws. 401  
Criminal laws should be cautiously applied, as lawmakers should attempt to 
procure maximum social benefits—effective prevention and control of 
misconduct at a minimum social expense—by reducing or eliminating 
criminal penalties. 402   China should address the issue of arbitrator 
impartiality, but it should consider the potential harms associated with penal 
punishment.  Some scholars are even worried that the law might be easily 
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misused which, in turn, would deter many foreign candidates that otherwise 
would have been appointed as arbitrators.403  It is a double-edged sword that 
might harm both the state and the individual.  Lawmakers should avoid 
employing criminal punishment as much as possible, and only consider that 
remedy as a last resort.  The previous function of criminal liability discussed 
above may be replaced by some other means of social regulation, such as a 
code of ethics or civil liability for arbitrators.   
B. Proposals for Reform 
As outlined earlier, the newly established criminal liability regime for 
arbitrators in China is riddled with problems.  The current regime can be 
described as a legislator-based system, which is characterized by paternalism 
and rigidity.404  It appears that impartiality of arbitration and deference to 
arbitral rulings are two conflicting values.  This problem is particularly 
severe and disconcerting in China.  The simplistic approach of the criminal 
enactment needs to be reformed because it is unable to achieve the goal of 
arbitrator impartiality.  This does not suggest, however, that China should 
wholly abandon the criminal provision 
In discussing the reform of the regime of arbitrator criminal liability, a 
better method for realizing the goal of reconstruction is through a judicial 
interpretation of the criminal statute, borrowing from the U.S. approach of 
deference to arbitration.  That is to say, during the judicial review of arbitral 
award, a court should carry out its responsibilities subject to the requirement 
of respecting the substantial matters such as the finding of facts and the 
application of laws in arbitration.  In general, it must be kept in mind that 
“although the arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a judge, there 
are critical differences between judges and arbitrators.”405  The goal of a 
judicial interpretation is to design an effective mechanism to ensure fairness 
and justice in the course of arbitration and, at the same time, give deference 
to an arbitral award.  In restructuring the criminal provision of a biased 
arbitrator, four aspects need to be taken into consideration:  1) private 
prosecution, 2) criminal liability for the neutral arbitrator, 3) civil liability, 
and 4) a detailed definition of the criminal provision. 
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1.   Private Prosecution 
To place an important check on the power of the People’s 
Procuratorates, Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” could be better reframed 
as a crime of private prosecution through judicial interpretation.  Rather than 
rely on heavy-handed public prosecution, judicial interpretation of the 
criminal provision can require private parties to exercise their private right 
of action if there is arbitrator misbehavior.  The complainant, instead of the 
People’s Procuratorates, should accuse the “biased” arbitrator of the crime 
and bear the burden of proof.  A comparable U.S. provision requires that a 
party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on the grounds of evident 
partiality must demonstrate “that a reasonable person would have to 
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration.”406   
After such a reform, the People’s Procuratorates would no longer have 
the power to prosecute an arbitrator.  Converting the prosecution from a 
governmental power into a party’s right could limit the potential for misuse 
of the criminal provision, since it is more difficult for a complainant—who 
has limited power to collect evidence compared to the People’s 
Procuratorates—to demonstrate a violation in court.  The more difficult it is 
for the complainant to bring an action, the higher the threshold is for 
implementation of the criminal provision.  Thus, there exists less potential 
for the misuse of the provision.  In addition, the U.S. approach in finding 
proof of corruption and fraud can be referenced in structuring the private 
prosecution. 
One potential concern regarding private prosecution is that it would 
promote too much litigation.  Some critics worry that if losing parties in 
arbitration are able to sue the arbitrator, they will frequently misuse the 
right.407  This concern is misplaced:  private prosecution does not necessarily 
lead to a flood of litigation.408  As the losing party bears a heavy burden to 
establish specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the 
arbitrator, they have more difficulty collecting evidence than in a public 
prosecution.  Without sufficient evidence, the losing party will likely 
recognize that their probability of success in a suit against the arbitrator is 
low.  A party that has lost in arbitration will also expect to lose before the 
courts.  In fact, the losing party fulfills the vast majority of arbitral awards.  
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Only a small fraction of all parties with disputes make a court filing, and 
only a small percentage of those that are actually filed go to trial.409 
2.  Criminal Liability Only for the Neutral Arbitrator 
The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an arbitral 
panel in international disputes is for each side to appoint one arbitrator, with 
a third arbitrator appointed either by the two selected arbitrators or by the 
arbitration commission or another appointing authority. 410   Non-neutral 
arbitrators have long been considered agents of the parties in many 
jurisdictions.411  In the U.S., it is acceptable for non-neutral arbitrators to be 
impartial and only the neutral arbitrator is required to be neutral.412  The 
most important aspect of an arbitrator’s impartiality is the duty of 
information disclosure,413 especially the information concerning a particular 
interest or identity.414 
In China, a significant issue that needs to be clarified is whether non-
neutral arbitrators assume the same penal responsibility as a neutral 
arbitrator.  For example, if an arbitral award is rendered on the basis of the 
opinion of the majority, and the arbitrators who make the decision are 
accused of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” it is not fair for the non-
neutral arbitrator to face the same punishment since he is not supposed to be 
“neutral.”  Non-neutral arbitrators sometimes are selected because a party or 
its counsel anticipates that an arbitrator of a particular type will react 
favorably to the arguments that the party plans to present, which, as to 
potential receptivity, is one of the advantages of arbitration. 415  
Unfortunately, nothing in the current Chinese law provides either a 
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distinction in liabilities among different arbitrators or a detailed working 
procedure of the criminal statute concerning the disclosure duty.416 
To ensure a smoother transition and structural adjustment, attention 
should be paid to the distinction between arbitrators on the panel, as they 
have different incentives in arbitral proceedings.417  There seems to be no 
good reason why all arbitrators should be required to be identically impartial 
since they have varied ways of appointment. 418   Some flexibility is 
necessary.  A clarification should be made in future judicial interpretation 
such that only the neutral arbitrator should be criminally liable for 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law.”  Such clarification would have a 
positive impact, especially since China is in a critical stage of encouraging 
the development of arbitration. 
3.  Civil Liability for Arbitrators and Arbitration Commissions 
Unfortunately, both the civil law tradition and arbitration experience 
in China do not yet provide a strong foundation for non-criminal means of 
controlling arbitrator misconduct.  In civil law countries, arbitration is 
deemed as a matter of contract instead of a means of adjudication.419  The 
arbitrator misconduct results in a liability similar to breach of contract.420  
Since arbitrators are not government officials like judges, it is not likely for 
them to commit a crime of dereliction of duty.421  However, as outlined 
earlier, arbitrators are viewed as judges in the context of China.  But under 
the civil law influence, Chinese law does not allow arbitrators to enjoy the 
judicial immunities which are available to arbitrators in common law 
countries.  After all, arbitration in China has not been developed along with 
the market economy, but occurred through official measures.422  Arbitration 
                                                      
416  See ZHANG JINFAN, supra note 289, at 311. 
417 See Fan, supra note 90, at 127. 
418 In respect of the Three-Arbitrator Tribunal, for example, CIETAC Arbitration Rules provides: 
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the government.  See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1756-57 
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in China lacks the nongovernmental characteristics as well as a professional 
regulation such as arbitrator ethics.423  In the background of a culture that 
favors criminal law, penal regulation of arbitrator misconduct has easily 
been thought the best option for China. 
Arbitration develops because of market economy, and market forces 
seem to function effectively and play a more important role than legal 
rules.424  Any change of institution must be prudential, especially regarding 
criminal law, as confidence in the criminal law is one of the most rooted 
legal faiths in China.  Chinese lawmakers seem to think that imperfect rules 
are better than none, given the lack of market rules, the absence of industry 
regulation, a code of arbitrator ethics, and civil liability, but fail to realize 
that the cure is worse than the illness.  In fact, “[e]nsuring the enforcement 
of standards and providing meaningful remedies to those injured by arbitral 
misconduct is equally as important as articulating standards of conduct and 
professional ethics for arbitrators and provider institutions.”425  Thus, arbitral 
institutions should enforce conduct standards enacted in the form of codes of 
ethics. 426   More importantly, the conduct standards, norms, rules and 
guidelines governing arbitrators’ professional conduct must be detailed 
rather than merely provided as abstract concepts. 
The basic role of arbitration is as a sort of legal service, which is, in 
essence, the market participants’ self-regulation and unofficial dispute 
resolution system without state intervention.427  Thus, the issue of quality of 
service is critical, and the  criterion of service recognized by the participants 
is necessary for the healthy development of the market.428  If the quality of 
service is lower than the standard of the market, and the service provider 
cannot be expelled, the result would be a decrease in quality of service and a 
collapse of the market in the end.429  In terms of arbitrator impartiality, it is 
reasonable and fair to make a biased arbitrator—the provider of poor quality 
service—assume some liability.  The core issue here is not whether the 
biased arbitrator should be liable, but how and to what extent he or she 
should be liable.  There are some market forces that discourage arbitrator 
misconduct.430  Arbitrators wishing to attract business have an incentive to 
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develop a reputation of impartiality.  Arbitrators’ actions may be restricted 
by custom, conscience, and concerns such as caring for their own reputation, 
or being sympathetic to both parties so that they are obedient to the law, 
even though there is no legal punishment.431 
Civil liability may affect China’s future arbitration regime.  As 
discussed earlier, arbitration is largely an alternative process for resolving 
disputes under private law. 432   Some commentators have presumed that 
parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to bear the risk of the 
arbitrator’s mistake in return for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive 
resolution to their dispute.433  “[A]n arbitration proceeding is more properly 
viewed as the product of contract.”434  All contractual agreements include 
the obligation to perform in good faith.435  Where an arbitrator acts partially, 
he or she betrays the principle of good faith and breaches the contract, which 
breach gives the injured party the right to sue the biased arbitrator for that 
breach.436  If a court determines that arbitrator misconduct existed in a case, 
the aggrieved party is usually entitled to damages.  The arbitrator could 
demand additional payment up front to compensate for the civil liability that 
he could face after the arbitration, which would be costly enough to make 
arbitration less appealing.  In order to attract customers, arbitrators compete 
not only through the quality of their decisions and the desirability of their 
procedures, but also on price.437  A single transaction can ruin an arbitrator’s 
reputation.  This, in turn, would give impartial arbitrators a price advantage, 
as many arbitrators are repeat players. 
From a policy perspective, it might even be desirable to hold 
arbitration commissions jointly liable for arbitrator misconduct.  It 
represents a transfer of the risk of liability from the arbitrator to the 
commission, which is forced to internalize the costs of liability—causing it 
to monitor the behavior of its arbitrators.  Assuming that arbitration 
commissions seek to attract business, arbitrators and arbitration commissions 
will seek to develop a reputation for impartiality.  If an arbitrator commits 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” on account of pecuniary interest, it 
certainly will have some impact on both the arbitrator and the arbitration 
commission’s reputation.  Fearing losing their job, the arbitrator, therefore, 
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would have no reason to do anything other than attempt to act impartially in 
the same circumstances and in the same fashion as a judge.  Arbitrators’ 
current incentive towards corruption would be replaced by an incentive to 
avoid unnecessary litigation.  As a whole, the civil liability approach would 
impose a duty on the arbitrator to handle cases in the same impartial fashion 
as would a national court.  Admittedly, there would still be some cases in 
which the risk of bias remains, but a large share of the potential instances of 
bias would be eliminated. 
4.  Detailed Definitions of the Criminal Provision 
By carefully defining the conditions of the criminal provision by 
listing some of the specific situations, future judicial interpretation can help 
make the enactment more workable.  The more detailed it is, the more 
authority the enactment has.  Taking into account the relationship between 
the spirit of arbitration and the purpose of legislation in practice, the judicial 
authority may start from the stance of respecting the contractual nature of 
arbitration and make some appropriate adjustments when interpreting the 
law.  For instance, the criminal provision can be restricted to domestic 
arbitration.  The “law” should not include foreign law because the criminal 
law is a public law and should be strictly limited to a particular territory.  
Also, the nature of arbitration requires more discretion than litigation and the 
criteria of an arbitrator’s “Perversion of Law” should be different from those 
of a judge.438  Further, when defining the issues of the provision, some  
principles such as party autonomy, good faith, public policy, and equal 
hearing  should also be followed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rights carry with them corresponding responsibilities.439  It has been 
recognized that arbitration rulings must be subject to some judicial review to 
ensure that an arbitral proceeding is operating within a state’s legal 
framework.440  This supports the conclusion that the judiciary should act as a 
watchdog in supervising arbitrators and providing a remedy when necessary.  
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However, the criminal provision of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” 
causes tension between arbitration impartiality and deference to arbitral 
rulings.  Particularly, the ambiguity of the provision makes it hard to 
function.  A better solution would be to use a judicial interpretation to 
restructure the criminal provision.  In the judicial interpretation, China 
should tailor the offence as a private prosecution, alleging criminal liability 
only for the neutral arbitrator.  Further, China should provide detailed 
guidelines for the criminal provision and civil liability for biased arbitrators.  
A judicial interpretation concerning the criminal provision of Arbitration by 
“Perversion of Law” can act as an effective mechanism to ensure both 
impartiality and deference to arbitration without abandoning the criminal 
provision.  Thus, arbitration could have sufficient protection from the misuse 
of government power while, at the same time, the necessary flexibility to 
deter a biased arbitrator.  
China has been seeking this balance for years.  Arbitrators should be 
required to assume liabilities in light of arbitral justice for losses of parties 
incurred from their deliberate or negligent misconducts in arbitration.  But in 
order to realize the efficiency of arbitration, arbitrators should also be 
granted a certain amount of immunity when performing their duties.  
Maintaining the balance between these two needs depends on the 
understanding of the nature of arbitration and the roles of arbitrators.  This 
balance reflects the different attitude towards arbitration.  The diversity of 
culture, tradition, and maturity of market economy among different nations 
plays a very important role in distinguishing the policies and laws of each 
nation.  China may take specific measures within its own context to support 
arbitration, but those measures should require deference to an arbitral award 
to protect the legal rights of the parties. 
